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INTRODUCTION
In October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the dangerous game
of nuclear brinksmanship. For the next two weeks, both countries went to their highest military
alert levels, and it seemed likely that both countries would go to war, with the probability of
nuclear exchange greater than ever before. In the months preceding the crisis, US intelligence
sought to discover the true nature of the Soviet buildup in Cuba, while their Soviet counterpart
tried to keep that buildup secret as long as possible. The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), John McCone, was one of the first government officials that discovered the large
military buildup underway in Cuba. Because of his own personal beliefs about communism and
his experiences with nuclear power, McCone led a personal effort to convince members of the
intelligence community and the Kennedy administration that the Soviets might take such a risk
and place nuclear weapons in Cuba. During the crisis, McCone was one of the intelligence
officials responsible for briefing the Kennedy administration on the Soviet efforts in Cuba. After
the crisis subsided, McCone provided Kennedy with confirmation that the Soviets had begun
removal of the missiles, officially ending the crisis. John McCone‟s role in the crisis is one of the
key facets to understanding the reasons of the crisis and its outcome.
Because of the declassification of government documents and memoirs from the
participants, historians have a wide range of documentation for their studies. Most historians
focused on the reasons why the crisis happened, and the role of government officials in his
outcome. However, even with the massive data available on the crisis, extensive studies on
President John Kennedy, his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and several other
advisors overshadowed McCone‟s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis. In most historical works,
McCone received little attention before or during the crisis. Even in the most detailed works,
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historians viewed his role as secondary to the crisis. Because of McCone‟s efforts, the U.S.
intelligence community found the missiles before they were completed, and the government had
the most recent intelligence it needed to make informed decisions during the Cuban Missile
Crisis.
McCone maintained throughout the summer and fall of 1962 that the Soviet Union might
place nuclear weapons into Cuba.1 Part of the reason for this hypothesis was the correct
assumption that the placement of missiles into Cuba gave Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev a
way to counter the growing American nuclear superiority, and protect the communist
government on Cuba.2 McCone made his concerns clear to President Kennedy and other
members of the administration before leaving on his honeymoon in late August 1962. During his
honeymoon, he called for more reconnaissance flights over Cuba, empowering his deputy,
General Marshall Carter, to continue his efforts in Washington. When he returned from his
honeymoon, he found gaps in the reconnaissance over western portions of Cuba, and pushed for
more reconnaissance flights.3 On the final of those authorized flights, October 14, the
reconnaissance flights found the missiles. McCone‟s “crusade”4 during the summer and fall of
1962 was a primary reason for the early discovery of the missiles.
At the start of the crisis, McCone delegated many of his responsibilities to his
subordinates, and created a committee composed of several intelligence groups to deliver daily
intelligence recommendations based on the daily reconnaissance flights. Continuing his crusade
against Castro, McCone joined several prominent members of the Executive Committee
1

John McCone, Memorandum for the File, “Discussion in Secretary Rusk‟s Office at 12 o‟clock, 21 August 1962,”
National Security Archives, Cuban Missile Crisis, http://www.nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed June 12, 2010).
2
Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House,
1991), 146.
3
Daniel James and John G. Hubbell, Strike in the West: The Complete Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), 9.
4
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy 1958-1964
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 198.
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(EXCOMM) proposing a surgical strike against missile sites followed by an invasion.5 Despite
his push for air strikes even during the blockade, McCone had the job of briefing the
administration on the intelligence reports, keeping Kennedy and his cabinet informed on the
Soviet military buildup in Cuba.6 Despite his emotional calls for attacks on Cuba, McCone‟s
efforts to combine the intelligence reports, analysis, and photo interpretation branches during the
crisis allowed the president to have a detailed picture on the withdrawal of the missiles, and
allowed him to make informed decisions when dealing with the Soviet government.7
After Kennedy made the decision to blockade Cuba, McCone utilized the committees he
organized during the first week of the crisis to bring detailed intelligence reports on the
construction efforts in Cuba and the status of Soviet ships bound for Cuba. He also had the
important task of briefing members of the press and Congress on the situation, and provided
deputies to answer questions during the UN talks, despite his personal belief that the talks hurt
the diplomatic standing of the United States. When the crisis weakened his emotional state, he
urged caution during EXCOMM deliberations, and requested that his deputies prepare daily
memorandums combining the evaluations of the joint committees and other CIA intelligence
reports. After Khrushchev authorized the removal of the missiles in Cuba, Kennedy, under
intense pressure from Congress and public, relied on the CIA Director for analysis on whether
the missiles had indeed left Cuba. McCone gave the administration the conclusions of the
analysts and committees studying the Soviet withdrawal, concluding that the Soviet Union
dismantled and shipped the missiles back to the Soviet Union.8 Again, McCone had the
5

George W. Ball, Past is another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 290.
Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile
Crisis (Cambridge: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1997), 118.
7
Norman Polmar and John D. Gresham, DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War during the Cuban
Missile Crisis (Hoboken: John Willey & Sons, 2006), 107.
8
“Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council,” U.S.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. XI,
6
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important role of giving Kennedy the evidence he needed that the missiles were in fact leaving
Cuba, officially ending the crisis.9
After the crisis subsided at the end of 1962, American historians began searching for the
reasons why the events took place as they did. In the years immediately following the crisis,
historians focused on what happened before and after, asking why the events happened and why
the government failed to prevent the crisis. Without classified government documents, historians
used their own experiences, evidence available at the time, and previous surprise attacks to prove
or disprove that the government could have prevented the crisis, or defend the government‟s
actions before and during the crisis.10 In the 1970s and 1980s, several historians used emerging
primary evidence from personal memoirs, actual intelligence training, and newly declassified
documents to shed light on the events, methods, and problems facing an earlier detection of
Soviet intentions in Cuba.11 Since the 1990s, both the U.S. and Russia declassified many Cold
War documents, creating resurgence in scholarship on the crisis. These archives led many
historians to re-evaluate interpretations of events. These new historians focused more on the
mindset of the U.S. government during the crisis, Soviet motivations for the introduction of
missiles into Cuba, and the intelligence efforts to keep that introduction a secret from the
Americans.12 This new scholarship inspires other historians to focus on evaluating the mindset of

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frus.html (accessed June 30, 2010). See also “Memorandum for the
Director, “Your Briefings of the NSC Executive Committee, 3 November 1962,” in Mary McAuliffe, CIA
Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), 353-355.
9
Ibid.
10
Roberta Wohlstetter, “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight”, Foreign Affairs XLIII (July 1965): 690707. See also Theodore “Ted” Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harpers and Row, 1965), 663-673.
11
Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1974),
306-312. See also McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the bomb in the First Fifty Years (New
York: Random House, 1988), 415-420.
12
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 163-220. See
also Roger Hilsman, Cuban Missile Crisis: A Struggle Over Policy (Westport: Praegar, 1996), 18-66.
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the analysts in the U.S. intelligence community.13 Other historians used the massive amount of
primary evidence in the post-Cold War era to make dramatic narrative histories of the Crisis.14
However, even with the number of works produced on the crisis, historians produced no
encompassing work on the importance of McCone‟s participation.
One of the reasons McCone has a secondary role in the majority of histories is the lack of
a published memoir. This requires historians of the Cuban Missile Crisis to draw from the
interviews, declassified documents, and memoirs from other men close to McCone to discover
his role in the crisis. Most historians choose to utilize the large array of sources to discover the
reasons why the crisis happened and how select members of the government influenced the
outcome. Most of the information on McCone‟s involvement in EXCOMM comes from other
participants such as George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Robert Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and
Theodore “Ted” Sorensen. Ball‟s memoir examined McCone‟s management of the intelligence
effort before and during the crisis, and showed McCone‟s repeated requests for more flights even
during his honeymoon.15 Bundy takes a more critical view on McCone, showing how McCone
used his position to convince the administration, without evidence, that the Soviets were placing
nuclear weapons in Cuba.16 Robert Kennedy‟s work is one of the best tales on the crisis, but
contained little information on McCone except for a few quotations.17 Schlesinger and Sorenson
emphasized how McCone challenged the viewpoint of Kennedy and the intelligence community,

13

Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 425-465.
See also Graham T. Allison and Phillip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New
York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999),
14
Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 162-181. See also Michael
Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Alfred
K. Knopf, 2008).
15
George Ball, The Past is Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 287-305.
16
Bundy, Danger and Survival, 419-436.
17
Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 86-93.
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and how he pushed the administration to re-evaluate their mindset.18 The best documentation on
McCone‟s involvement came from the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Kennedy
Tapes, Mary McAuliffe‟s CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis and Dino Brugioni‟s
Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Out of the many primary
sources on the Cuban Missile Crisis, McAuliffe‟s CIA Documents provided the best evidence on
McCone‟s importance during the crisis through the declassified CIA memorandums produced by
McCone and his deputies.19 Brugioni‟s insight as a peripheral member in the crisis provided key
insights into McCone‟s management style and his role outside the EXCOMM meetings.20 The
Foreign Relations of the United States draws heavily from McAuliffe‟s work on the meetings, as
well as providing information from the messages between other members of EXCOMM.
Most of the information on McCone‟s involvement came from excerpts from larger
works on issues facing the U.S. during the crisis. The most detailed work that studied McCone‟s
involvement in depth was Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali‟s One Hell of a Gamble,
where McCone received a small section on his “crusade” during the summer and fall of 1962.21
Another excellent source on McCone‟s involvement with the intelligence mission comes from
James Nathan‟s Anatomy of a Missile Crisis. In this work, Nathan produced an excellent
background on McCone, from his beginnings as a successful executive, his time as Chairman of
the Atomic Energy Commission, and his service as head of the CIA.22 Other writers such as
Graham Allison, Bruce J. Allyn, Michael Beschloss, Don Bohning, James Blight, Lawrence

18

Arthur Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (New York: Black Dog &
Leventhal Publishers, Inc., 1965), 678, 797-799. See also Theodore “Ted” Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper‟s
and Row, 1965), 667-705.
19
McAuliffe, CIA Documents, 8-354.
20
Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 68-127, 135-169, 311-321, 346-353, 391-392, 423-424, 440-562.
21
Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 163-220.
22
James Nathan, Anatomy of a Missile Crisis (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), 24, 77-78, 145-147.
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Freedman, Phillip Nash, Robert Weisbrot, David Welch, and Philip Zelikow together help build
a more complete picture of McCone‟s efforts during the crisis.
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow focused on the reasons the Soviets placed missiles in
Cuba, and noted that McCone was one of the first officials to recognize the Soviet reasons.23
Beschloss detailed how McCone‟s background influenced his views about the Soviet Union, and
his belief that the Soviets might place nuclear weapons in Cuba.24 Philip Nash‟s The Other
Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the JUPITERS gave an excellent analysis on
McCone‟s arguments supporting the decision to remove the JUPITER missiles from Turkey in
their negotiations with the Soviet Union.25 A complement to Nash‟s work is Bohning‟s detailed
analysis of the covert operations authorized against Castro during the summer of 1962. Bohning
provided information on how the intelligence resources used for the earlier operations helped
McCone discover the true nature of the Soviet buildup in Cuba.26 Allyn, Blight, and Welch‟s
Cuba on the Brink contained a brief section on McCone‟s clash with members of Kennedy‟s
administration on the missile issue, and credited McCone as the principal figure in the discovery
of the missiles.27 Freedman‟s Kennedy’s Wars is one of the best recent sources on the crisis that
contained many important facts about McCone, from his involvement in covert operations
against Castro, his search for the missiles, and his efforts as part of EXCOMM.28

23

Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York:
Addison Wesley Longman, 1999), 80-96.
24
Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960-1963 (New York: Harper/Collins, 1991),
413-430.
25
Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the JUPITERS, 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
26
Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession: US Covert Operations against Cuba, 1959-1965 (Washington, D.C.:
Potomac Books, 2006), 114-128.
27
James Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, The Missile Crisis, and the Soviet
Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 124-126.
28
Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 153, 161-167, 170-179, 184-202, 213-236.
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While the recent surge in crisis studies produced several detailed works on the event,
little work exists on connecting John McCone‟s influence throughout the period before and after
the crisis. Most historians viewed McCone as the primary reason that the United States found the
missiles, but used information on his role as part of a larger study on the crisis itself. McCone
was a key member of the intelligence effort to find the missiles, and served as one of the core
members of EXCOMM when the president needed solutions to the discovery of the missiles in
Cuba. When Khrushchev made the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba, McCone took on
the responsibility of overseeing the intelligence sources he created during the crisis to determine
if indeed the Soviets were removing the missiles from Cuba. Therefore, McCone‟s involvement
in the Cuban Missile Crisis is one of the key facets to understanding how the crisis began and the
role the U.S. government had in ending the conflict.

8

CHAPTER ONE: John McCone and the Intelligence Mission
John McCone was the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from November 1961
to April 1965. During the summer and fall of 1962, he maintained that the Soviet Union might
place nuclear weapons into Cuba. Part of the reason for this hypothesis was his belief that the
placement of missiles into Cuba would give Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev a way to counter
the growing American nuclear superiority and protect the communist government on Cuba.29
McCone made his concerns clear to President John Kennedy and other members of the
administration before leaving on his honeymoon in late August 1962. During his honeymoon, he
used his deputy, General Marshall S. Carter, to continue his efforts in Washington. When he
returned from his honeymoon a few weeks later, he still found gaps in the reconnaissance over
western portions of Cuba and pushed again for more reconnaissance flights.30 After the president
finally authorized more flights, the October 14 flight found the missiles. McCone‟s “crusade”31
was a primary reason for the early discovery of these missiles.
McCone was born in January 1902 to a wealthy family in San Francisco. His father,
Alexander McCone, ran the family‟s iron foundries throughout California. In 1922, McCone
graduated from the University of California at Berkeley with a degree in engineering, and began
working in the steel industry. McCone rose through the ranks of several steel factories, became
the Vice President of the Consolidated Steel Corporation, and helped establish the BechtelMcCone Corporation. As founder and as an engineer, McCone had a role in the design and
construction of several oil refineries, factories, and power plants in the Americas and the Middle
East. Even during the Great Depression, McCone managed his businesses making large sums of
money through construction projects. During World War II, he founded the Seattle-Tacoma
29

Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 146.
James and Hubbell, Strike in the West, 9.
31
Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 198.
30
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Corporation, and invested $100,000 into the California Shipbuilding Corporation, making a $44
million dollar profit by the end of the war. After the war, McCone served in the Truman
administration as a Deputy to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, and as the Under Secretary
of the Air Force. During his time within the Truman administration, McCone played an
important role in the incorporation of nuclear weapons into air warfare tactics.32
Along with his business savvy and government experience, McCone had the look of a
Republican tycoon, with his “rimless eyeglasses, white hair, roseate complexion, and three-piece
suits.”33 In 1958, McCone‟s business experience, government experience, Republican ideals, and
his staunch belief in the importance of nuclear technologies led President Dwight Eisenhower to
appoint him as the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).34 Yet even in the
Republican administration, McCone found himself as an outsider due to his outspoken comments
on the importance of nuclear weapons.35 McCone‟s comments made him many enemies within
the Eisenhower administration, especially on the issue of the nuclear test ban, which he
opposed.36 McCone believed that Soviet propaganda encouraged many Americans to support the
test ban treaty, and fought against President Eisenhower‟s support for the ban as well.37 The
main reason McCone maintained his position as Chairmen of the AEC was the fear of the
political consequences if Eisenhower removed a Republican he had placed in the position.38
While McCone served in the AEC, a revolution broke out in Cuba. The dictatorship of
Fuglencio Batista led many Cubans to resent their government and his American supporters.39

32

Nathan, Anatomy of a Missile Crisis, 145. See also “John A. McCone and Mrs. Pigott marry in Seattle,” August
30, 1962, The New York Times, 20.
33
Nathan, Anatomy of a Missile Crisis, 146.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 417.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Edward H. Judge, A Hard and Bitter Peace (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall Press, 1996), 160.
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Fidel Castro became the leader of the dissenters, and pushed for the overthrow of the oppressive
Batista government. Castro and his movement toppled the Batista government faster than experts
in both the United States and the Soviet Union had predicted.40 As Castro consolidated his
power, he declared Cuba a socialist state, modeled after the teachings of Karl Marx and Vladimir
Lenin. This dramatic event provided the Soviet Union with a tremendous opportunity, while for
the United States this event proved its worst fears. With a Soviet-backed communist nation in
Latin America, the Soviet Union could pressure many Latin American countries into accepting
communism, undermining the U.S.‟ close neighbors. With the close proximity of Cuba to the
United States, roughly ninety miles, the Soviet Union could threaten the security of the U.S. by
placing weapons in Cuba.41
In response to recommendations from the intelligence community, the newly elected
President John F. Kennedy approved a plan for an invasion of Cuba to remove Castro from
office.42 On April 12, 1961, the invasion commenced, with surprise air strikes against Cuba air
force buildings and installations with Cuban forces landing on the beaches. However, the attacks
eliminated only half of the Cuban air force, and Kennedy denied several requests for air
support.43 As a result, the invasion failed, with 114 dead and 1,189 captured. This failure
severely shifted international opinion away from the United States, and led to an overhaul of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Kennedy showed his displeasure, when he exclaimed that the
“CIA should not undertake operations where weapons larger than hand guns are used.”44 He

40

W.W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York: MacMillan, 1976), 49-52.
Furesenko and Nafatali, One Hell of a Gamble, 200. See also W.W. Rostow, Diffusion of Power: An Essay in
History (New York: MacMillan, 1976), 49-52. See also Herbert S. Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile Crisis
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), 21.
42
Marchetti and Marks, CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, 30.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
41
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replaced Allen Dulles with McCone as Director of CIA (DCI) despite McCone‟s Republican
credentials.45
There were several reasons Kennedy placed the Republican executive at the head of the
CIA.46 Both McCone and Robert Kennedy‟s families attended the same Catholic Church, and
they became close during the sickness and death of McCone‟s first wife, Rosemary Cooper.47
Arthur Schlesinger, an aide to Kennedy, believed this friendship had a large role in the selection
of McCone, but McCone‟s reputation as a “rigid cold warrior” was also important.48 While
McCone was not Kennedy‟s first choice as DCI, he was impressed with McCone “for his
reputation as a man of action,”49 and believed that his appointment “would deflect opposition to
his [Kennedy‟s] intention to reduce the CIA‟s size and autonomy after Bay of Pigs.”50 Kennedy
also appreciated McCone‟s knowledge of Soviet missile strength, and without deliberation with
his cabinet, the president appointed him as Director of the CIA in November 1961.51
Once he arrived at the CIA headquarters, McCone made sweeping changes to the
organization, beginning with the elimination of the intercom system that allowed senior officers
to interrupt the Director in his office.52 McCone replaced many of Dulles‟ deputies and most of
the division chiefs, and battled with the Pentagon on the use of intelligence planes, satellites, and
better logistical support.53 Because of his prior relationship with the AEC, McCone set up a CIA

45

Polmar and Gresham, DEFCON-2, 46.
Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence As Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 41.
47
Nathan, Anatomy of a Missile Crisis, 146. See also “John A. McCone and Mrs. Pigott marry in Seattle,” 20.
48
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 459. See also
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (New York: Black Dog &
Leventhal Publishers Inc., 1965), 429.
49
Nathan, Anatomy of a Missile Crisis, 146.
50
Beschloss, Crisis Years, 417.
51
Ibid.
52
Nathan, Anatomy of a Missile Crisis, 148.
53
Ibid.
46
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briefing for the commission to keep it informed on Soviet nuclear capabilities.54 McCone also
had the advantage of being new to the intelligence community, giving him a more objective
viewpoint on intelligence estimates.55 McCone entered the office as the Agency released reports
on the Bay of Pigs operation. One report, from Lyman Kirkpatrick, detailed the reasons for the
failure of the operation.56 Kirkpatrick made the mistake of handing the report directly to McCone
instead of using the proper channels, a breach that angered McCone as much as the report itself
did.57 This incident led “the hawkish republican” to impose stricter guidelines on intelligence
reports, and later blamed Kennedy and Dulles for failing to make the invasion work.58 McCone
earned the reputation of a “hard-driving executive” as DCI, but many believed him to be a much
more cautious and realistic manager than previous directors.59 McCone had the important role of
repairing the reputation and morale of the CIA, by utilizing new measures to protect secrecy and
provide quality national intelligence.60
While McCone reformed the CIA, tensions mounted between the Soviet Union and the
United States. After the Bay of Pigs, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet
government voiced support for the Castro regime and issued several warnings to Washington.61
Castro, fearful of future invasions, began requesting larger arms shipments from the Soviet
Union.62 Khrushchev agreed to send larger supplies of small arms, at the same time increasing
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the economic assistance to the fledging communist nation.63 In Khrushchev‟s mind, the situation
in Cuba and the success of the regime coincided with the overall prestige of the Soviet Union in
the international independence movement of the early 1960s.64 The Soviet assistance at the time
involved personal weapons and vehicles, as Khrushchev delayed his decision to introduce
weapons systems that were more expensive.65
In April 1962, after making the decision to send military aid to Cuba, Khrushchev
continued receiving reports of increased American subversion efforts in Cuba.66 With the Soviet
Union falling farther behind in the construction of nuclear missiles, and the threat to the
communist government in Cuba, Khrushchev felt he had two choices: to focus the overstretched
Soviet economy on either a costly nuclear buildup or on much-needed domestic improvements.67
The Soviet premier analyzed the situation and realized Cuba‟s importance to the communist
movement and the advantages to placing nuclear weapons on the island to secure Castro and
balance the strategic situation with the Americans.68 It was then that Khrushchev decided to
supply Cuba with long-range weapons to accomplish his goals. Khrushchev saw that the best
option to solve these dilemmas was to introduce medium and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (MRBM, IRBM), weapons that the Soviet Union had in surplus. This decision solved
the two issues without overstretching the Soviet economy.69
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The Soviet Union began making official plans to send offensive weapons to Cuba during
May.70 The first step in formulating the plan was to sell the idea to Fidel Castro. While many in
the Soviet government believed that Castro would not accept a large Soviet base in Cuba, the
negotiations concluded with the decision to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba. Khrushchev
assigned Rodion Malinovsky, his Defense Minister, to create an operation to hide the
deployment from Western intelligence.71 On May 24, the Soviet government initiated Operation
ANADYR to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba, and prepared the selected units for deployment.
Khrushchev believed that the presence of nuclear missiles in Cuba would counterbalance the
American superiority in long-range ballistic missiles and guaranteed the safety of Cuba.72
Operation ANADYR went into effect in June 1962, and preparations for the shipment of
materials to Cuba began.73 With the amount of materials and personnel assigned to ANADYR,
the operation marked the clear divergence from past Soviet assistance to non-bloc countries.74
According to Anatoly Gribkov, one of the staff assigned to planning ANADYR, the sheer size of
the operation meant American intelligence would eventually discover the missiles.75 The plan
called for large shipments that contained several missile divisions of the Soviet Rocket Forces,
anti-aircraft weapons, jet fighters and bombers, and radar equipment.76 To confuse Western
intelligence, Malinovsky and his staff chose the name ANADYR for the operation, in relation to
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the Anadyr River that flows through eastern Siberia.77 Soviet personnel received orders to pack
for frigid weather, stating their destination for somewhere in the upper regions of Siberia. En
route into the Atlantic, Soviet captains, under the supervision of Committee for State Security
(KGB) officers, opened their destination orders, learning that Cuba was their destination.78
Soviet personnel offloaded the materials at night in Cuba only, and concealed their transport to
the construction sites.79 These methods limited the possibilities of premature discovery of the
contents of the shipments.80
During the same period the Soviet Union enacted ANADYR, the United States had a
secret operation underway in Cuba, codenamed MONGOOSE. The Kennedy administration
enacted MONGOOSE to remove Castro‟s government from power. A select group of
Washington officials met together to discuss subversion and reconnaissance plans. Officials such
as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Deputy Undersecretary Alexis Johnson, General
Maxwell Taylor, and General Lyman Lemnitzer served in the Special Group. Robert Kennedy
also attended many of the MONGOOSE meetings, but had a more limited role. While
MONGOOSE focused on efforts to collapse the Castro regime, it had the unexpected role of
revealing the beginnings of the Soviet buildup in Cuba, which led to increased reconnaissance of
the island.81
MONGOOSE used several methods for gathering intelligence in Cuba. The first method
involved surveillance of shipments destined for Cuba, and the types of weapons or materials they
contained. The second came from first-hand accounts from refugees fleeing Cuba for the United
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States. The use of intelligence agents on the ground in Cuba provided the most accurate
information on the ground. Photoreconnaissance, the final method, provided the concrete proof
needed for Washington to act on the intelligence reports from Cuba.82 The surveillance of
shipping bound for Cuba carried with it inherent limitations and problems. While satellite and
reconnaissance planes provided detailed photographs of the ships bound for Cuba, much of the
contents remained in the holds within the ship. For those crates on the decks, the CIA used a
specialized system known as “crate-ology”.83 This system utilized a computer and calculated
measurements of items in reconnaissance pictures, formulating their size for analysts to compare
to their data on Soviet technology. This system had its restrictions, hindering its use as evidence.
The system did correctly identify the crates transporting bomber and fighter parts on the decks of
the Soviet ships, but neither the crate-ology system nor the standard shipping intelligence
methods found the MRBMs within the holds of the ship.84
Since the overthrow of the Batista government in 1959, thousands of Cuban refugees fled
to the United States and brought reports with them. These refugees brought stories of dramatic
events in Cuba, notably reports of missiles in Cuba. These reports contained a numerous false or
incorrect accounts. This caused the “cry wolf phenomenon”85 to develop inside the intelligence
community. The sheer volume of the reports also made this form of intelligence insufficient on
its own.86 In terms of providing evidence for Soviet actions in Cuba, the system could do little
more than describe the situation for the people of Cuba and for the mentality of the common
people on American efforts in Cuba.87
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Photo-reconnaissance provided the verification that policy makers in Washington needed
to take action in Cuba. The most useful photo-reconnaissance came from the Lockheed U-2
high-altitude reconnaissance plane. The U-2 proved incredibly useful over the skies of Cuba in
1962. The main problem to this method of reconnaissance is its dependence on good to fair
weather to bring back accurate pictures. Within hurricane season in the Caribbean, there were a
limited number of days each month for complete coverage of Cuba. The Soviet Union also
devised a defensive missile system to engage high altitude aircraft, increasing the risk over areas
where the system existed. Up to September 1962, Cuba lacked this missile system, but after their
installation, the Kennedy administration decided to limit the flights over the island.88
MONGOOSE became the primary focus for McCone and the CIA in the summer of
1962. On August 1 during the Special Group meeting, McCone presented the intelligence
community‟s analysis of the strength of Castro‟s regime and the potential for organized
resistance against his government. The report concluded that Castro had consolidated his control
over the communist party in Cuba, a fact recognized by the Soviet government. Despite their
differences, the intelligence community believed that the Soviet and Cuban relations improved
from March to August, with the Soviet Union sending military equipment and advisors to aid the
Cuban military. The report stipulated that while the Soviets increased their military shipments to
Cuba, they provided only defensive weapons. According to the available data, the Soviets had
not made a formal commitment to protect Cuba and had not decided to station Soviet troops on
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the island. This conclusion led the community to believe that the Soviets would not enhance their
commitment to Cuba in the near future.89
McCone‟s experiences in the Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission along with
his anti-communist ideals influenced his unique analysis of the early reports of Soviet military
equipment in Cuba.90 The experiences in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations made him
skeptical of Kennedy‟s “Flexible Response,” because he believed that the nuclear balance
remained the crucial deterrence to Soviet aggressions. To McCone, the minimum number of
nuclear missiles and warheads did not count as deterrence and assumed Khrushchev felt the same
way. Because of this mindset, McCone was more receptive to the idea of the Soviet Union using
Cuba as a missile base, despite the prevailing mindset within the administration and the rest of
the intelligence community that the Soviets would not take such a risk.91
While the intelligence community had little knowledge of Soviet plans for Cuba, the
early reports of increased shipments from the Soviet Union to Cuba alarmed McCone. On July
26, the first ANADYR shipment aboard the Maria Ulyanova arrived at the port of Cabanas.92
Reports of the first shipments arriving in Cuba did not reach Washington until the first week of
August. McCone viewed the increase in Soviet personnel and the sudden increase in shipments
as the first steps in a new Soviet commitment to Cuba.93 On August 10, McCone voiced his
concerns about Cuba during a meeting with the Special Group. McCone reported on the sudden
increase of unidentified military equipment and Soviet personnel, and possibly electronic
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equipment to compromise rocket tests at Cape Canaveral.94 During the meeting, McCone
“expected that the Soviet Union would supplement economic, technical, and conventional
military aid with medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM).”95 He justified his beliefs by
comparing the Soviets placing missiles in Cuba with the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.96
McCone‟s fears of the future deployment of missiles in Cuba continued to grow as more
reports arrived in Washington. On August 20, he presented the Special Group with the analysis
of the intelligence gathered since the August 10 meeting, based on sixty intelligence reports
arriving from Cuba and reconnaissance flights over Soviet vessels and Cuban ports. According to
intelligence reports, twenty-one Soviet ships docked in Cuban ports during the month of July,
with seventeen ships en route in the Atlantic at the time of the report. Soviet personnel offloaded
unknown materials from the docked vessels in large crates under extreme security precautions.
McCone believed that these crates possibly contained airplane fuselages or missile components,
and some contained components for radar equipment. Along with increased supplies,
approximately 4,000 to 6,000 Soviet personnel arrived in Cuba in July and August, but no
evidence of organized units. The implications of this operation, according to McCone, were that
the crates possibly contained components for surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems,
Communications Intelligence (COMINT) equipment, or Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)
systems. These systems posed a problem for future reconnaissance flights and operations in the
Caribbean.97
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The Special Group decided to brief other members of the administration on the Cuban
situation in light of the most recent intelligence. On August 21, Rusk held a meeting in his office
with McCone, McNamara, Johnson, Taylor, Lemnitzer, and Bundy. McCone stated its purpose
was to bring other members of the cabinet up to date on the recent intelligence on Cuba. The
DCI detailed that at the August 10 meeting, he gave as much information as available, and that
since there was a substantial increase in Soviet assistance to Cuba. The extent of the Soviet
operation was much more involved than previously believed, with preliminary indications of
sophisticated electronic equipment and missile sites. McCone reiterated his concerns that the
Soviets might place MRBMs into Cuba, and proposed that the administration have plans in place
if it occurred. The group understood the critical nature of the situation and discussed various
options in case the Soviet Union decided to risk placing nuclear missiles in Cuba. The group
proposed a partial and total blockade, but feared that it might lead to similar actions by the Soviet
Union in Berlin, Italy, and Turkey. McCone proposed aggressive actions in intelligence,
sabotage, and guerilla warfare, and detailed the disappointing results in Cuba up to that point.
The committee at the end of the meeting agreed that the situation was critical enough to brief the
president, and McCone arranged a meeting with the president for Wednesday, August 22.98
The following day, McCone brought the military buildup in Cuba to President Kennedy‟s
attention. McCone reported, “Intelligence of recent Soviet military assistance to Cuba indicates
that an unusually large number of Soviet ships have delivered military cargos to Cuba since late
July.”99 Construction projects underway in Cuba used materials and personnel offloaded from
four Soviet ships, with at least 1,500 passengers. An additional 1,500 personnel arrived from late
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July to the end of August, bringing the total number of Soviet personnel in Cuba to 5,000.
McCone believed the Soviets had begun an unprecedented military aid program to Cuba, a
program new and different from previous efforts.100
Despite the large number of Soviet personnel, the report stipulated there was no direct
evidence of organized army units in Cuba. Intelligence sources reported two large military
construction sites on the northern coast of Cuba, with regular convoys from the ports to those
construction areas. The construction appeared confined to northwest Cuba, and photoreconnaissance showed limited activity in other regions of the island. McCone concluded that
while they had little knowledge of the nature of the construction, it could be the initial phases of
a SAM defense system, intelligence-gathering facilities, or possibly missile sites. The general
conclusion that the community and McCone agreed on was that the construction proved that the
Soviet Union had taken a strong step forward in protecting Cuba. Despite McCone‟s suspicions
on the introduction of missiles into Cuba, the president, Rusk, and McNamara doubted that the
Soviets would risk moving nuclear missiles into Cuba.101
While Kennedy did not believe the Soviets would risk placing missiles into Cuba, he
joined the Special Group meeting on Thursday, August 23 with McCone, Rusk, McNamara,
Gilpatric, Taylor, and Bundy. When the group discussed possible responses for Soviet actions in
Cuba, McCone again raised the issue of what the administration should do in case the Soviets
placed offensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedy requested more intelligence of Soviet personnel
presently in Cuba, and the number and type of weapons delivered to the island. Kennedy
anxiously wondered whether photo interpreters could decipher between SAM sites and surface-
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to-surface missile (SSM) sites.102 McCone told the president, “We probably could not
differentiate between surface-to-air and 350 mile ground-to-ground offensive missiles.”103
Kennedy wanted more analysis on the danger missile installations posed to the United States and
Latin America, and whether the administration should release a statement detailing the American
position on missiles in Cuba.104 During the discussion, McCone questioned the value of the
JUPITER missiles in Italy and Turkey, and inquired how difficult they were to remove.
McNamara spoke up stating that the JUPITERs “were useless, but difficult politically to
remove.”105 The president wanted to know how to move against Soviet missiles in Cuba, using
air strikes or an increased subversion effort.106
In response to McCone‟s recommendations, Kennedy ordered a series of studies and
reactions on the Soviet buildup in Cuba. National Security Action Memorandum 181 queried the
Department of Defense about the possibility of removing the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. It called
for a study on the implications of giving the intelligence to members of the Organization of
American States (OAS) and asked them to limit their assistance to Cuba. It also called for an
analysis of possible actions if they discovered Soviet surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba. Bundy
reiterated to the agencies that the president wanted an immediate response.107
On August 25, McCone made his final recommendations before leaving on his
honeymoon. McCone urged his deputy, General Carter,108 to recommend that the administration
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support more reconnaissance flights to determine the extent of the construction projects
underway in Cuba.109 After giving his last orders to Carter, McCone left Washington on August
26, bound for Seattle, Washington, where he married Theiline Pigott110 on August 29.111 On
August 30, the couple departed for Cape Ferrat on the French Riviera where they remained for
most of the month of September.112 With McCone out of the country, Carter replaced McCone in
meetings with the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and the MONGOOSE Special
Group.113 On August 29, Carter met with the USIB, where he detailed his conversation with
McCone and Lemnitzer on using Air Force RF-101114 and Navy RF-8115 reconnaissance aircraft
to supplement the U-2 in Cuba.116 The following day, Carter attended the Special Group
meeting, where he argued that other types of photography failed to provide enough detail on
certain construction sites. Based partly on Carter‟s arguments, the Special Group agreed to study
the issue further and locate specific targets that had the greatest need of low-level flights.117
Carter sent several telegrams to McCone keeping the Director informed of the recent
intelligence on Cuba and on the outcome of the meetings with the administration.118 With
McCone‟s support, Carter kept ranking members of the administration from dismissing the idea
109
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that the Soviets might place nuclear weapons into Cuba. Rather than suppress McCone‟s
repeated statements that he believed the Soviets would place missiles in Cuba, Carter reiterated
his ideas to important officials in Washington. Carter‟s importance to McCone‟s efforts became
clear as the agency received more and more reports on construction projects in Cuba.119
The first definitive report of the presence of SAM sites in Cuba came from a U-2
reconnaissance flight on August 29. The U-2 flight that day covered areas around Havana and
other parts of Western Cuba, and showed several construction sites consistent with previous
SAM sites in the Soviet Union. Preliminary analysis identified the SAMs as the SA-2
Guideline120, the same missile system responsible for downing Gary Power‟s U-2 in 1960. On
August 31, Carter reported the readout of the U-2 flight to Bundy and Lemnitzer. After Bundy
informed Kennedy of the conversation, Kennedy contacted Carter that afternoon. Kennedy put a
freeze on distribution of the report, giving the intelligence community time to prepare an
extensive briefing for him.121
On September 1, Carter spoke with Ray Cline, the Acting Deputy Director of Intelligence
(DD/I), authorizing him to prepare a full analysis of the photography. Cline presented his
analysis to Carter on September 3, which showed not only the presence of SAM sites, but also
guided missile boats, and additional land armaments. The photography discovered eight SAM
sites under construction, and another unknown site being prepared. Due to the speed of the
construction from overflights earlier in the month, analysts believed the sites could be
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operational within two weeks. The U-2 also discovered eight Soviet missile boats, each armed
with anti-ship missiles. The following day, Carter informed McCone in a telegram of the
construction as well as his belief that the report altered the Cuban situation. Carter assured
McCone that he would continue to push the administration for more reconnaissance flights
during the scheduled briefing with the president later that day.122
Following the briefing at the White House on September 4, Kennedy released a statement
on the presence of SAMs and guided missile boats in Cuba. The statement included much of the
information from Cline‟s report, and the conclusion that reconnaissance showed no offensive
missiles. The statement did include a warning to the Soviets, where Kennedy stated that “where
it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.”123 After the release of the President‟s
statement, the Special Group met to plan the next series of overflights. The summer weather over
the Caribbean had limited the amount of useful photography on a majority of the August flights,
leaving the Group to choose where to concentrate future reconnaissance flights. Carter approved
the recommendations from McCone and the Special Group to direct the next flight to cover
“those areas of the island which were not photographed because weather or range did not
permit.”124
After Carter authorized the Deputy Director of Research (DD/R) Herbert Scoville125 to
create a plan for overflights of Cuba, he sent another telegram to McCone on September 5, where
he detailed the Soviet and Cuban response to the president‟s ultimatum. At the time of the
telegram, the Soviet Union had remained silent on the president‟s speech. The Cuban
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government released its own statement emphasizing their right to self-defense against Americansponsored attacks. Sources in Cuba believed that Castro might use the situation to justify
increased Soviet military assistance, to divert intelligence sources from his economic and
political problems. The next day, McCone received another cable from Carter which confirmed
that Cuba had requested more Soviet assistance, but that the Soviet government “does…not
desire [to] develop Cuba as Soviet base [in] this hemisphere.”126 While the Soviet government
insisted on this sentiment to Rusk, Carter was reporting to McCone the confirmation of nine
SAM sites.127
McCone viewed the Soviet response with caution, because of his conviction that
Khrushchev saw the situation as a means of balancing its strategic situation with the United
States. The intelligence analysis from the August 29 mission led the intelligence community to
believe that another missile site near Banes, Cuba might be a SSM site. The president once again
chose to limit the dissemination of the report outside of the intelligence branches. When McCone
received the report of this site, it fueled his suspicions concerning the Soviet intentions in Cuba.
McCone reiterated his suspicions to Carter on September 7. After he thanked Carter for keeping
him informed, McCone told Carter, “My hunch is we might face [sic] prospect of Soviet shortrange surface-to-surface missiles or portable type in Cuba which could possibly command
important targets of Southeast United States and possibly Latin American Caribbean areas.”
McCone prepared to meet with the French General Paul Jacquier in Paris, while he continued
advocating low-level flights. The final point he suggested to Carter was that he speak to Rusk to
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help develop policies for possible action in Cuba should the Soviets introduce missiles, even to
the point of briefing other Latin American nations on current intelligence.128
Reports of missiles in Cuba continued to surface in early September. Angel Gonzales,
Chief of the Mexican branch of the Student Revolutionary Directorate, released a report to the
New York Times showing the installation of guided missile sites in the Pinar Del Rio Province.129
In Carter‟s response to McCone‟s telegram, he quoted a report that the son of a Cuban official
had “‟Rockets of some kind that shot down U-2‟…and preparations being made for „complete
destruction‟ of Guantanamo Base in event of attack on Cuba.”130 The situation in Cuba had
reached the attention of the Republicans in Congress as well. According to Carter, Congressional
Republicans gave the president the authority to invade Cuba if necessary. Carter planned to take
McCone‟s statements on using RF-101 for reconnaissance and the introduction of missiles to
Cuba again during the scheduled meeting with Bundy on Saturday, September 8.131
Despite McCone‟s continuing correspondence to Washington, a series of problems with
the U-2 complicated the intelligence-gathering mission. The U-2 flight on September 5 failed to
produce any usable photography over the Banes site because of cloud cover.132 On August 30
and September 8, a series of U-2 incidents led the Kennedy administration to re-evaluate the
risks involved in using the aircraft over Cuba. On September 4, the day of Kennedy‟s ultimatum,
one of the U-2s accidentally penetrated Soviet airspace in the Soviet Far East, prompting the
Soviets to send fighters to intercept.133 When Kennedy learned of the incursion, he immediately
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prompted a halt to the missions over Soviet territory.134 On September 8, a U-2 was lost over the
Chinese mainland, prompting even more restrictions on U-2 flights over Cuba.135 After this
incident, Kennedy halted the entire program pending a briefing to review procedures.136
Carter informed McCone of the decision to halt reconnaissance flights over Cuba. In
Carter‟s September 8 telegram, he provided McCone another intelligence report on the
September 5 U-2 flight. The new photographs showed three more SAM sites, located in the Las
Villa Province in Central Cuba. In addition to the sites found on August 29, the total number rose
to thirteen with the current report. Carter believed that 25 sites provided Cuba with a complete
missile defense against approaching aircraft. Reconnaissance also showed one advanced Soviet
MiG-21 fighter137, and possibly the parts to assemble nineteen more. Rusk asked Carter to
convey his thanks for suggesting the creation of contingency plans with Latin American allies,
and promised to take it under advisement. At the end of the telegram, Carter informed McCone
of the decision to halt further U-2 flights pending an investigation.138
On September 10, Carter sent another message to McCone, updating him on the search
for the missing U-2. Despite a detailed search, intelligence had yet to find any sign of the U-2
and had no information on the fate of the pilot. There was no evidence of any mechanical
malfunction, leaving either pilot error or attack as the primary possibilities. Carter pointed out
the interesting fact that the Soviet Union failed to take advantage of the incident as in previous
incidents, but the community had no other information on the Soviet reaction. Carter assured
McCone that the Board of National Estimates (BNE) received his previous comments on Cuba,
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and promised to add his ideas to their analysis. In response to McCone‟s suggestion on using
PROJECT KELLY139 over Cuba, Carter argued that the program might be usable in April of the
following year.140
McCone was apprehensive of the president‟s decision to halt U-2 flights over Cuba.
While he believed that the U-2 incident was distressing, in his mind, the U-2 remained the best
intelligence-gathering method available to the intelligence community. In his September 10
response to Carter, McCone believed that the danger of an incident always existed with the U-2,
stating, “I pointed out to Special Group Pacif [sic] and higher authority that an incident was
inevitable.” Once again, McCone took the opportunity to make his views on missiles in Cuba
known to Carter. It was in this telegram that McCone gave his reasoning for the placement of
missiles in Cuba. McCone wrote, “[it is] Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses
being established in Cuba as such extremely costly measures to accomplish security and secrecy
not consistent with other policies…It appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are
for the purpose of insuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs to be installed
by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights.” McCone
concluded his message with a remark on how the beautiful weather helped make that
determination and urged Carter to have the BNE study the possibility in detail.141
Later that afternoon, Kirkpatrick attended the White House meeting on Cuban overflights
and sent notes from the meeting in the daily cable to McCone. According to Kirkpatrick, Bundy
called the meeting to share with the CIA the administration‟s concern over the Cuban overflight
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program. Bundy informed the group that Rusk questioned Carter, stating, “How do you expect
me to negotiate on Berlin with all these incidents.” Rusk then analyzed the proposal for two
more overflights to over the areas that the August 29 and September 5 flights missed. The risk of
a third incident convinced Rusk to allow for peripheral flights around the island and over
international waters. Rusk authorized four flights, two peripheral and two over international
waters, to limit the risk to the safety of the pilots. At the end of the meeting, Kirkpatrick noted
that Bundy and Rusk agreed that the overflights would continue if no further incidents
occurred.142
While the Special Group considered the future of U-2 flights over Cuba, Carter sent
McCone‟s recommendations to the DD/I and requested that the BNE create the necessary
analysis. Carter sent another memorandum to McNamara asking for further reconnaissance over
the Banes site. The U-2 could not effectively photograph this site, meaning that other
reconnaissance aircraft might be useful. On September 11, Washington also received the first
official Soviet response to the President‟s September ultimatums and the U-2 incidents, which
Carter sent to McCone along with the BNE‟s response. According to the Soviets, any American
attack on Cuba would unleash a global war. The Soviet government believed the United States
had plans to invade Cuba, and took steps to boost its defenses.143 On the subject of the presence
of missiles in Cuba, the BNE viewed the placement of SAMs in Cuba as “reasonably explained
by other than desire to hide later buildup.” The report argued that the Soviets might place
missiles in Cuba, but that the risk involved was not equal to the dangers of American
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intervention. The BNE promised to include their preliminary report in the Special National
Intelligence Estimate.144
While McCone and the Board of National Estimates argued over Soviet intentions, the
intelligence community continued analyzing the photography. On September 13, intelligence
reports provided more information on the suspicious missile site near Banes. It stated that the
facility appeared to be a cruise missile battery, possibly the SS-N-1, the SS-N-2, or the SS-C1.145 The report showed the location of similar missile sites near Bay of Pigs and other beaches,
which led to the analysis that their placement coincided with probable invasion locations from
American troops.146
When McCone learned of the SSM site at Banes, he immediately repeated his statement
that the present construction projects were the prelude to the introduction of nuclear missiles in
Cuba. Despite the Agency assessment that the Soviets sent only defensive weapons to Cuba,
McCone once again wrote, “Also I continue to be concerned that the establishment of defensive
equipment and installations is merely a prelude to the location of an offensive weapons
capability.”147 Carter responded to McCone‟s telegram immediately, informing him that
intelligence reports showed that Soviets had twenty-nine ships bound for Cuba. Refugee reports
showed the movement of SAM equipment, and other sources showed the arrival of more torpedo
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boats and anti-submarine ships. Carter made no comment on McCone‟s statement about the
missiles, but Kirkpatrick confirmed that Carter took the comments to the BNE and kept the
Special Group informed on McCone‟s fears.148
McCone made repeated requests to the BNE to study the prospects for the Soviet Union
placing missiles in Cuba. When McCone received word of the Soviet comments comparing their
aid to Cuba with American aid to nations surrounding the Soviet Union, he again urged the
Board to study the feasibility of the Soviets secretly sending offensive weapons to Cuba. He
made the comment “we must carefully study the prospect of MRBM‟s in Cuba” to show how
strongly he believed that the Soviets would introduce those weapons.149 McCone believed that
the Soviets would use Cuba similar to how the United States used Britain, Italy, and Turkey. He
argued that the CIA and rest of the intelligence community had the responsibility to keep the
government informed of the dangers if the Soviets chose to take the risk. From the press report
McCone received, the director believed that the estimate needed to include a usable distinction
between the terms “offensive” and “defensive” weapons. If nuclear weapons did exist in Cuba,
McCone suggested a study on how long the Soviets needed to install the missiles and asked the
board to consider regions of the island where the SAM defenses would hinder overflights.
McCone concluded that the estimate should include all these elements and include alternative
plans of action should they find missiles in Cuba.150
The rift between the analysts and McCone became apparent with the release of the BNE‟s
report on Cuba. While McCone‟s suspicions of Soviet intentions in Cuba continued to grow as
he received more intelligence reports, a majority of the intelligence community believed that the
Soviets did not intend to take such a risk in light of the expected American response. On
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September 16, Carter sent a copy of McCone‟s cables to Cline. After Cline reviewed the cable,
he stated, “An introduction of MRBMs was unlikely because of the risk of U.S. intervention.”151
On September 19, the BNE released their assessment of the military buildup in Cuba with the
Special National Security Estimate 85-3-62. This estimate stated that the purpose of the Soviet
military buildup in Cuba was to strengthen Castro‟s regime by creating an advanced air defense
and coastal defense network to thwart any invasion. The board believed there was a great
temptation for the Soviet Union to introduce nuclear weapons into Cuba, and other offensive
weapons such as IL-28 bombers, submarines, and short-range SSMs. The report stated, “The
Soviet Union could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet
medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba.”152 It stressed, however, that it would
be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy.153
When McCone received the Special Estimate from Carter on September 19, he viewed it
with skepticism, but acknowledged that he had no hard evidence of missiles. McCone responded
to the estimate on September 20, in which he made several recommendations to Carter. He
believed that the Board should re-evaluate their conclusion on the risk of the Soviet Union
placing nuclear missiles in Cuba. McCone believed that, “An offensive Soviet Cuban base will
provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other
critical areas and hence might take an unexpected risk in order to establish such a position.”154 At
the end of his cable, McCone wanted to have the most recent Cuban intelligence documents with
him to discuss with the Bundy during a scheduled meeting in Paris. Later that day, McCone
received word from Kirkpatrick that Carter passed his requests to Cline, and the Intelligence
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Director made no changes to the estimate, because the intelligence community endorsed and
released it.155
As McCone traveled back from Europe, the intelligence community received a series of
reports on the presence of missiles on the island. On September 20, the CIA received a report
dated September 9 that Claudio Morinas, Castro‟s personal pilot, made the statement “there will
be many mobile ramps for intermediate-range rockets.”156 Another agent sent a report on
September 12, which the CIA received on September 27. The agent reported a large convoy of
vehicles headed for the San Cristobal area of Cuba, with trailers seventy feet in length, believed
to be carrying large missiles.157 A similar report arrived in Washington on October 1, detailing
another large convoy in the Pinar Del Rio with eight large trailers, carrying “huge tubes” larger
than the flatbed.158 These detailed reports from reliable sources led some analysts in the CIA to
study the possibility of the trailers transporting SS-4 “Sandal” missiles.159
McCone viewed these reports as confirmation that the U.S. needed to increase
surveillance of the island. During the Special Group meeting on October 4, McCone urged the
administration to authorize a series of U-2 reconnaissance flights. Robert Kennedy began the
meeting reiterating President Kennedy‟s concern with the lack of success in the subversion of
Castro‟s regime. McCone told Robert Kennedy that one of reasons for the problems in
MONGOOSE was the hesitation of the government to risk American assets. After a brief
argument, the group agreed to re-consider the limitations placed on the U-2. McCone encouraged
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the group to authorize flight plans to include complete coverage of the island along with the
approved peripheral flights. Because of the limited number of flights and the peripheral
coverage, McCone noticed a large gap over Western Cuba overlooked since September 5. The
group agreed with McCone, and proposed that the members prepare a plan of action and submit
their proposal during their next scheduled meeting. They decided that the new overflights were
justified by stating the flights were, “in the interest of our own security and the security of the
Western hemisphere.”160
McCone understood the need for more U-2 flights, and made those concerns known to
members of the administration. On October 5, McCone reiterated his concerns in a meeting with
Bundy. After discussing the conclusions of the Special Group, McCone stated, “the decisions to
restrict U-2 flights had placed the United States Intelligence Community in a position where it
could not report with assurance the development of offensive capabilities in Cuba.”161 While
Bundy did not believe the Soviets would take that risk, McCone argued “it [was] most probable
that Soviet-Castro operations would end up with an established offensive capability in Cuba
including MRBMs.”162 McCone believed that Bundy shared the views of most of the intelligence
community, but he could not agree with their recommendations. He wanted the president to
authorize complete coverage of the island with the U-2. The meeting ended with the agreement
to review the situation in more detail over the weekend.163
While the administration did not believe the Soviets would place missiles into Cuba,
President Kennedy made a public statement that the U.S. would conduct overhead
reconnaissance of the island. Kennedy also met with the Special Group when they made their
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decision on October 9 to launch a series of U-2 flights covering the western portions of Cuba.
The Group agreed on two purposes for the next flight: to test the readiness of the SAM defense
system and cover the areas reported from the intelligence agents in Cuba in late September. From
October 10 to October 13, the weather halted the U-2 flight, but on October 14, the U-2 covered
areas around Havana, and was the first flight to discover the presence of nuclear missiles in
Cuba, the missiles that McCone believed the Soviets might place in Cuba.164
McCone came to the Central Intelligence Agency as a successful manager with strict
anti-communist ideals and great insight into intelligence. When the intelligence community
received the first reports of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba, McCone correctly argued that
the present buildup was the first phase in the establishment of a nuclear missile base on the
island. He justified this belief through his understanding of the strategic situation between the
Soviet Union and the United States. He believed that while the risk was great to the operation, it
also provided the Soviet Union a way to balance many of their objectives without risking reprisal
from either Cuba or the United States. While McCone took a lengthy honeymoon during the
crucial month before the crisis began, he pushed Deputy Director Carter to continue his efforts to
keep the administration from being surprised if intelligence confirmed his beliefs. McCone
continued to encourage Washington officials and the BNE to consider that the Soviets saw the
great advantage to having nuclear missiles in Cuba, sending several cables to Carter and other
CIA officials. While the BNE believed that the Soviets would not risk placing offensive weapons
in Cuba, several reports from intelligence sources led several analysts to agree with McCone that
they needed more reconnaissance flights. After arriving back from his honeymoon, McCone
pushed the Special Group and the administration to authorize a new series of flights to cover the
164
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island. When the U-2 covered the island on October 14, it found the MRBM missile sites under
construction. The photographs from the U-2 confirmed McCone‟s fears and launched the Cuban
Missile Crisis. Had it not been for McCone‟s continued efforts, the missiles would have been
operational before their discovery by the United States.
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CHAPTER TWO: John McCone and the EXCOMM
After learning of the October 14 U-2 flights, McCone pushed the Kennedy administration
to remove Castro and his communist government from power. Continuing his crusade against
Castro, McCone joined several prominent members of the Executive Committee of the National
Security Council (EXCOMM) in proposing a surgical strike against missile sites followed by an
invasion.165 McCone had the job of briefing the administration on daily intelligence reports and
construction efforts in Cuba.166 His greatest contribution to the intelligence effort was his
coordination and integration of all the major civilian intelligence agencies during the Crisis to
reduce the time required for analysis. He also had the job of briefing former President
Eisenhower on the situation in Cuba, and pushed for briefings with the allies. Despite his
emotional calls against negotiations with the Soviet Union, McCone‟s efforts to coordinate and
integrate intelligence reports allowed the president to have a detailed picture on the status of the
Soviet missiles, allowing Kennedy to make informed decisions when dealing with the
Kremlin.167
On October 14, a U-2 reconnaissance flight found several Soviet MRBMs construction
sites in Western Cuba. The U-2, piloted by Air Force Major Richard Heyser, collected 928
images during its brief flight over Cuba.168 When the film arrived at the National Photographic
Intelligence Center (NPIC), analysts found three MRBM sites near San Cristobal, with eight
MRBM transporters located adjacent to those sites.169 On October 15, intelligence analysts
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reported that the missiles were either SS-3 “Shyster”170 or SS-4 “Sandal” ballistic missiles, with
a maximum range of 1,100 nautical miles. The report stipulated that there was no evidence
precisely when the missiles arrived in Cuba, but their judgment was that they arrived sometime
in September.171 The decision to place missiles in Cuba showed the determination of the Soviets
to deter any American intervention against Castro‟s regime, by increasing the risk and costs of
such a conflict. The report concluded that the Soviet leadership must have known that it would
complicate the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that the
presence of missiles in Cuba threatened the large military bases and urban areas in the
southeastern United States.172 The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had eighteen bomber and
tanker bases within that range, and an Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silo. The Navy
had three major bases and other smaller facilities from Panama to Puerto Rico that the missiles
had the range to reach. The biggest target that the missiles could reach was Washington D.C.173
When the U-2 discovered the missiles, McCone was on the West Coast preparing to bury
his stepson.174 Because McCone needed to escort the body from California back to Seattle for
burial, Carter replaced him in meetings with the National Security Council, while Cline replaced
him at the Commonwealth-US Intelligence Methods Conference.175 When Cline returned from
the conference, he met with a delegation of intelligence analysts who informed him of the
presence of missiles in Cuba. Because McCone was on the West Coast and Carter was at an
informal gathering in McLean, Virginia, Cline spent much of the evening studying the
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intelligence reports before attending the gathering. When Carter received word from Cline about
the intelligence report on Cuba, Carter authorized its dissemination to members of the United
States Intelligence Board (USIB) and to McCone. McCone received news of the U-2 report from
Walter Elder, his deputy in Washington, where he reported to the DCI, “That which you alone
said would happen did.”176
On Tuesday, October 16, President Kennedy called a meeting in the Oval Office.177
Carter took McCone‟s place on the committee during the first meeting, where he briefed the
President and members of the cabinet on the intelligence from the October 14 flight.178
McNamara, Rusk, Ball, Gilpatric, Taylor, Vice President Johnson, Dillon, Robert Kennedy,
Bundy, Sorensen, and Kenneth O‟Donnell, President Kennedy‟s Special Assistant, all attended
the briefing. Rusk made the comment that McCone saw the possibility of missiles back in
August, and related the conversation with McCone about the Soviets using Cuba like the United
States used Turkey.179 Rusk proposed several courses of action for the group to consider. He first
proposed a series of air strikes, followed by an invasion of the island.180 He also proposed a
warning to Castro and steps to isolate Cuba from the rest of the Free World.181 McNamara
argued that if they attacked Cuba, they must attack before the missiles became operational, while
Taylor confirmed that a surprise attack was essential to that attack. Kennedy authorized several
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U-2 flights to cover the island, and asked for a report linking the Cuban situation with other Latin
American nations and European allies.182
After the meeting, President Kennedy decided to create a special committee to devise a
plan of action regarding the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The members of the committee
would meet every day to determine the course of action, taking the name EXCOMM, an
abbreviation of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. 183 When McCone
arrived back in Washington, he immediately became an active member of EXCOMM, along
with Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, George Ball, Bundy, Dillon, Gilpatric, Robert
Kennedy, McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, Ted Sorensen, the Special Counsel to the President, and
Llewellyn Thompson, the Ambassador to the Soviet Union.184 On the evening of October 16,
McCone met with Albert Wheelon, the Deputy Director of Science & Technology (DD/S)185 and
Chairmen of the Guided Missile & Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) and Arthur
Lundahl, the Director of the NPIC, to create procedures for handling and reporting information
concerning Cuba.186 He also approved the transfer of information to the NPIC in order to reduce
the time it took to create intelligence reports, and established a joint committee of the major
intelligence boards to release several estimates on the reports.187 At 10:30 PM, McCone
concluded his day with a briefing with the president for further study of the photographs.
McCone‟s managerial skills once again became apparent when he decided to delegate
some of his authority to his deputies to allow him to focus on EXCOMM. McCone stood down
as Chairmen of the USIB because of the conflict of interest as a member of EXCOMM charged
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with reviewing their reports, passing that duty to Carter.188 He gave Lundahl greater authority at
the NPIC by passing most of the intelligence directly to their offices to reduce the time it took to
prepare estimates. Albert Wheelon, Chairmen of the GMAIC, took on an added role of preparing
joint estimates from the major intelligence boards after it came to Lundahl. When Lundahl
received the information, he passed it immediately to Cline, who then passed that information to
McCone. When Carter received the information in the USIB meetings, he passed their
recommendations to EXCOMM. McCone‟s delegation of authority gave him more leeway in
making recommendations during EXCOMM meetings, while still receiving the raw intelligence
from his deputies and the estimates from the intelligence board.189
Before meeting with EXCOMM on Wednesday, October 17, McCone prepared a list of
talking points. McCone argued, “The establishment of medium-range strike capability in Cuba
by the Soviets was predicted by me in a least a dozen reports since the Soviet buildup was noted
in early August.”190 McCone also believed the purposes of the missiles were to give Cuba an
offensive power to use if attacked and to enhance the “Soviet strike capability against the United
States.”191 McCone believed that another motive was to intimidate other Latin American nations,
notably Mexico, from aiding in efforts against Castro. While the Soviets installed the missiles in
Cuba, the defensive capabilities of the island continued to expand, a point that McCone reiterated
from his earlier concerns about such an expensive missile defense system. For McCone, there
was no doubt that despite the number of Cubans working at the sites, the missiles themselves
remained entirely under Soviet control.192 The United States could not allow missiles to remain
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in Cuba, but McCone stipulated that they could not launch a surprise attack if they wanted
international pressure on the Soviet Union. McCone proposed sending a warning to the Soviets
giving them twenty-four hours to remove the missiles, and proceed with a massive air attack if
the Soviets refused.193
The first meeting of EXCOMM focused on the choices available to the United States
regarding the Cuban situation.194 Ball argued that any military action in Cuba would limit their
options with their NATO allies. Further, he believed that the U.S government needed to consider
that Khrushchev might not know what was going on in Cuba. Ball and Maxwell Taylor agreed
that it might just be a ploy by Khrushchev to provoke an American response. McNamara avoided
taking a position during the first meeting, wanting more time to study on all the facts available.
Current intelligence reports showed fifty or sixty MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters in Cuba.195 Soviet
ships delivered parts for IL-28 bombers, along with at least one MiG-21 interceptor. The report
confirmed three MRBM sites under construction, which could be ready in two weeks.196 The
report showed no evidence of nuclear warhead storage sites, and failed to determine if the
Soviets intended to place conventional or nuclear warheads on the missiles. McCone received
reports from Lundahl on a number of crates of unknown purpose, and at least twenty-eight
Soviet ships en route to Cuba with similar cargo. McCone argued several points from his notes,
including how strongly he believed that the Soviets were using missiles in Cuba to force the
United States to trade their bases in Europe. McNamara believed that they needed more
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information on the command and control of the missiles in Cuba, and McCone promised more
facts throughout the day.197
McCone and Bundy left immediately after the meeting to confer with the president in the
White House. The meeting focused on the intelligence-gathering actions for that day, along with
the proposed plans of action to remove the missiles.198 The discussion was brief because of the
short amount of time between meetings scheduled for that day; so, McCone only referred to
several of his warnings that he proposed in his memorandum.199 McCone believed that Kennedy
“seemed inclined to act promptly if at all, without warning, targeting on MRBM‟s and possibly
airfields.”200 When Kennedy made the statement that a congressional resolution granted the
president the right to attack Cuba, Bundy agreed, confirming to McCone the president‟s intent on
action. Kennedy entrusted McCone with the role of briefing former President Eisenhower on the
Cuban situation.201
McCone immediately departed for Gettysburg, Pennsylvania to brief Eisenhower. The
DCI met with Eisenhower to review the developments in Cuba, including all the current
intelligence on the Soviet military buildup and the U-2 photographs of the MRBM sites.202
McCone followed Kennedy‟s order not to promote a position during his meeting with
Eisenhower, presenting many the proposals of EXCOMM members.203 Eisenhower had no
problem believing that the Soviets would place offensive weapons in Cuba, because he had dealt
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with the same ideas during his last year in office.204 The former president criticized the failure at
the Bay of Pigs and the failure of MONGOOSE to remove Castro from office, especially during
the months before the Soviets sent weapons to Cuba. He believed that an ultimatum to Castro
and Khrushchev would fail, and that a blockade would bring difficulties of its own.205 McCone
believed that Eisenhower favored military action to cut off the Cuban government with an
invasion, ending the situation with limited bloodshed. McCone promised to keep him informed
and consult him, whether or not he received a message from Kennedy.206
McCone immediately returned to Washington to attend afternoon and evening
EXCOMM meetings. During the meetings, the group once again discussed plans of action for
Cuba. Ambassador Charles Bohlen, who joined EXCOMM during the first few days, argued
against any military action in Cuba, because it would divide their allies and subject the United
States to criticism around the world.207 Rusk believed that the administration should ask
Congress for a declaration of war against Cuba, but keep their options open afterwards. Ball
emphasized the time constraints on action, meaning that the quicker they acted the less risk it
imposed on the United States. Kennedy wanted to know how America‟s allies, notably Turkey,
Italy, and Britain might respond to an American response to missiles in Cuba. McNamara did not
believe the missiles were that great a threat to the United States, and Gilpatric supported his
opinion. McCone stated, “That McNamara‟s facts were not new as they had appeared in
estimates months ago.”208 To McCone, the presence of those missiles in Cuba was of great
military importance, while McNamara downplayed that point.209 When Bohlen and Thompson
204
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questioned Soviet actions in Cuba, McCone believed that Berlin was just one of several reasons
for the missiles being in Cuba, but that Berlin was not the primary reason for their existence.
Despite their disagreement on the military importance of the missiles, McNamara, McCone, and
Taylor agreed that talks with the Soviets gave Khrushchev the time to prepare the missiles for
launch and to camouflage the sites.210
After considering the military option, the group moved to the pros and cons of a naval
blockade. The group argued over a partial or total blockade, with McCone pointing the strengths
of a total blockade.211 Before the group adjourned for dinner, McCone once again argued that the
primary goals of action in Cuba were to dispose of the missile sites and remove Castro‟s
government from power. Rusk took charge when the meeting continued later that evening,
stating that, “The United States cannot accept operational MRBMs in Cuba.”212 Talks gave the
Soviets the time they needed to prepare the missiles, leaving the option of air strikes as the
primary means of achieving their goals. Rusk proposed a timetable that began with a briefing of
key allies followed by a series of sorties against the sites. McCone and Taylor supported the
military strike option, while Bohlen continued to support the diplomatic route. Thompson and
Martin supported the blockade option, while the rest of the group remained neutral on the issue,
including Gilpatric, Johnson, Bundy, and Sorensen. Despite the difference in opinions, the group
prepared plans for each option, including the consequences of each, allowing each member to
promote his own views.213
While McCone spent much of the evening in conference with EXCOMM, Wheelon
prepared a memorandum for McCone containing the first in a series of combined intelligence
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from the NPIC along with the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
(GMAIC) and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC). Based on the
photographs from the U-2 flight on October 14 and the two flights from October 15, the
committee found at least one Soviet missile regiment with eight launchers and sixteen MRBM
missiles at two launch sites in Cuba. Because the committee believed the Soviets had 650-850 of
such missiles, it estimated that there were probably between sixty and eighty stationed in
Cuba.214 Further analysis of the photography showed two other MRBM launch sites under
construction, bringing the total to three. The photographs from the October 14 and 15 missions
showed remarkable building progress, including the appearance of erectors for the missiles along
with temporary buildings and vehicles. The report stipulated that if the missiles were of the 1,020
nautical mile range, the first of them could be operational immediately if needed.215 However,
because the photos did not show the missile silhouette facing upwards, the committee argued that
the Soviets might not have the warheads in place for use. If not ready immediately, the
committee agreed that the missiles could become operational in a matter of days.216
McCone also received an intelligence report from Lundahl on the October 15 flight. On
the second flight on October 15, the U-2 found what appeared to a probable IRBM site under
construction, previously reported as military equipment. The photographs showed an erector
already in place with six missiles in the vicinity. While the report did not stipulate that the
missiles were in fact IRBM, the construction site itself confirmed to previous Soviet
emplacements in Eastern Europe. Lundahl met with McNamara at his home the next morning,
which led McNamara to call McCone expressing his concern about the IRBM sites. Both
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McNamara and McCone agreed that this intelligence “demanded more prompt and decisive
action,” and promised to bring it up at EXCOMM meeting later that morning.217
During the morning meeting on Thursday, October 18, McCone briefed EXCOMM on
the intelligence reports he received Wednesday evening and on his meeting with Eisenhower.
After briefing the group on the report from Wheeler, Lundahl delivered his report on the October
15 photography. The president asked Lundahl if a novice could see that the pictures showed
MRBM missiles, and Lundahl believed that they must have low-level photography for the public
to understand the images. Rusk‟s opinion changed to promoting action against Cuba, viewing the
island now as a “formidable military threat.”218 Rusk proposed a quick strike against the missile
sites, believing it to be the best option despite the risk of retaliation. Thompson and Bohlen
reiterated their previous objections to immediate military action, with Thompson pushing for a
declaration of war from Congress if the group authorized military action, and proposed a
blockade instead.219 McCone, Dillon and Taylor suggested immediate military strikes, because
they believed that diplomatic efforts would limit the options. McNamara and Ball argued that a
strike without warning would lead to Soviet retaliation somewhere in the world.220 The group
agreed that the president should confront Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet minister of Foreign
Affairs, on the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedy requested that the group study
the advantages and disadvantages to either a blockade or air strike against Cuba.221
McCone joined many EXCOMM members in promoting the air strike option to remove
the missiles from Cuba. Because McCone believed that the missiles would be operational within
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the week, he supported the air strikes option over the blockade.222 One of the reasons he feared
the Soviet missiles was his belief that the Soviet military gave more control to their battlefield
commanders.223 The intelligence reports from October 18 solidified his beliefs, and led other
members such as Dillon, Taylor, Acheson, and Bundy, along with the Joint Chiefs, to support the
air strike option.224 McCone even suggested that an air strike alone could not remove all the
missiles. He proposed an invasion of Cuba to remove the missiles and Castro‟s government.225
By the end of the Thursday meetings, however, many EXCOMM members had moved away
from the air strike option, due largely to arguments by Robert Kennedy and McNamara about the
historical impact of a surprise attack.226 After hearing the attorney general‟s arguments, Rusk and
Bohlen became more outspoken in their opposition to the air strikes, and instead pushed for the
blockade options. McCone, while becoming more open to the idea of a blockade, also took a
strong stance against Ambassador Adlai Stevenson‟s suggestion that the United States confront
the Soviet Union at the United Nations.227 He continued to emphasize the problems with a
blockade, and during the evening meeting with the president, supported the air strike option. By
the end of the meeting, the consensus that existed earlier in the meetings broke down, leading the
president to order them to return to their arguments, scheduled to continue on Friday morning. 228
McCone showed his support for the air strike during the meeting with the president, but
understood that the group favored the blockade option.229 Before his meeting on Friday morning,
McCone sent a message to the USIB, and requested an intelligence estimate to assist him in
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future meetings. McCone believed that the group favored a blockade, and that the United States
should declare war on Cuba only as a last resort. The limited blockade sought to prevent more
weapons arriving in Cuba and to become a total blockade if Castro and the Soviets continued
construction on the missile sites.230 McCone believed that continued surveillance was critical to
either option, because it provided crucial information on the status of the missiles. McCone
argued that if they chose the blockade option, it would begin with a public announcement from
the president and limited notification of allies on Monday, October 22.231 It seemed to McCone
that the air strike option was on hold until after they attempted the blockade, because many in the
group believed an air strike and invasion was unwise. Those who supported the blockade
believed it gave the administration the ability to increase or decrease pressure according to the
situation, and provoke a less severe Soviet reaction. McCone argued, “The obvious
disadvantages are the protracted nature of the operation…the action does not reverse the present
trend of building an offensive capability within Cuba nor does it dispose of the existing missiles,
planes and nuclear weapons.”232 However, the air strike option was a dangerous option in itself,
because of the possibility of severe international reaction, and the possibility of a Soviet
escalation. McCone wanted the board to give him the assistance he needed to choose the best
options for the United States.233
Following McCone‟s request, the USIB released a Special National Intelligence Estimate
on October 19, which analyzed the possible Soviet reactions to American actions regarding
Cuba.234 The board argued that the major Soviet objective in Cuba was “to demonstrate that the
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world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the U.S. can no longer prevent the
advance of Soviet offensive power even in its own hemisphere.”235 It also hypothesized that the
Soviets might be using the missiles to force the United States into negotiations in Europe. If the
United States did nothing about the missiles, the Soviet Union would introduce strategic nuclear
weapons, contributing greatly to the Soviet strategic capabilities.236 If the administration chose to
warn the Soviets, the board concluded, “We do not believe the Soviets would halt the
deployment.”237 They would ask for negotiations on other foreign bases, and push for a
resolution to the Berlin situation. If Kennedy chose to warn the Soviets, it would hinder the
surprise air strike option. If he chose a blockade, the Soviets would “exert strong direct
pressures elsewhere to end the blockade.”238 If the United States launched an invasion of Cuba, it
would force the Soviets to respond and possibly start a war. However, the board considered the
Soviet decision to launch a war unlikely; instead, they believed they would launch an attack
against Berlin.239
Cline reported on the board‟s intelligence estimate during the Friday morning EXCOMM
meeting.240 After hearing the report, Rusk argued that the president needed a legal framework if
he launched a military invasion of Cuba. After deliberations, many in the group supported the
idea of rationalizing action in Cuba as self-defense. On the issue of a warning, McCone
stipulated that a warning did not improve their position and possibly hindered it.241 If they
decided to support a defensive blockade of Cuba, it would involve force, which the United
Nations charter prohibited except in certain situations. Martin proposed a solution to the United
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Nations Charter: a unanimous vote from the Organization of American States (OAS). It would
give the president a legal framework for an air strike, invasion, or blockade.242
After the group discussed the legal ramifications of the actions for Cuba, it renewed its
disagreements on either an air strike or a blockade.243 According to Robert Kennedy, “the strain
and the hours without sleep were beginning to take their toll.”244 Bundy questioned the reasons
why the group recommended a blockade to the president the night before. He asked for further
deliberations on both suggestions, because of the problems inherent with both. A blockade did
not remove the missiles, meaning they needed something more substantial. He moved to support
the air strikes, because he supported decisive action.245 Acheson agreed, and stated, “Khrushchev
has presented the United States with a direct challenge, we were involved in a test of wills, and
the sooner we got to a showdown the better.”246 Dillon and McCone agreed with Acheson, which
divided the group once again. Taylor believed that supporting a blockade would be “a decision to
abandon the possibility of an air strike.”247 He supported the air strike option, an option that
required the president to make a quick decision.248
While many of the group migrated back to air strikes, McNamara supported the blockade
alternative but suggested that the military prepare for the air strikes if the president chose that
option. Robert Kennedy also supported the blockade, because an air strike had too many
implications for international opinion, and went against the traditions of the United States.
Besides killing many Cubans, it would kill many Soviet personnel as well. Arguments continued
into the afternoon, when Rusk pointed out that the group‟s duty was to present the president with
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the best options for his consideration. He proposed two working groups, each tasked with writing
papers on the advantages and disadvantages to their assigned option. Johnson headed the
blockade group, composed of Thompson, Martin, Gilpatric, and Meeker, while Bundy was to
head the air strike group, which contained Dillon, Acheson and Taylor. Despite his belief that the
air strike option posed the best course of action for the president, McCone remained off the air
strike group due to his position in the intelligence community.249
During the course of the day, McCone shifted his support away from the air strike option,
but did not fully support the blockade.250 After the two groups deliberated on their course of
action, the EXCOMM reconvened at 4:00 AM. At that time, each group voiced their proposal,
after which each member showed their support or criticism for the plan.251 The group began with
the blockade proposal, where criticism led to many changes in the original plan. First, the group
agreed there was not enough time to have everything ready for the president to make an address
on Sunday. Legally, Thompson stipulated that they needed twenty-four hours between
Kennedy‟s address and enforcement of the blockade, to allow the Soviet commanders the time
needed to inform their ships.252 The blockade plan also contained a list of actions needed to
ensure success of the operation, including a scenario that mapped out the blockade and
international reactions.253 Around 6:00 PM, the group moved to the air strike proposal, where
Bundy detailed the plan in a relatively short time, allowing the group to attack their plan as
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well.254 After each group voiced their plans, there was general agreement that either option posed
its own risks, including the possibility of the Soviets forcing the United States to give up the
missile bases in Turkey and Italy.255 At this point, McNamara made an important statement that
calmed many of the air strike proponents. He stated, “An air strike could be made some time
after the blockade was instituted in the event the blockade did not produce results as to the
missile bases in Cuba.”256 When Robert Kennedy voiced his support for McNamara‟s proposal
towards the end of the meeting, McCone noted a great shift in the group towards a blockade.257
Later on Friday evening, the joint intelligence committee released another evaluation
based on the ten separate U-2 missions from October 14 to October 17. The committee reported
that the October 16 flights confirmed the existence of three MRBM sites and two IRBM sites.258
Current intelligence showed the sites manned by Soviet personnel, but they did not know if
regional forces or Soviet high command had direct control of their use. One key component to
the Wednesday intelligence was the identification of a nuclear warhead storage site near the most
completed construction site at Guanajay.259 The committee believed that the warheads could
already be in Cuba, despite the lack of photography on an operational nuclear storage site. At
present, intelligence photographs showed twenty-four launchers when completed, each with the
ability to fire multiple missiles. More missiles arrived during the week onboard the freighter
Poltava.260 Of the twenty-six SAM sites located in Cuba, intelligence reported 16 operational
batteries. For the coastal defense sites, the committee believed two were operational. 261 The most
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startling revelation came from “several refugee reports indicating the presence of tactical
(FROG262) missiles in Cuba.”263 With the increased rate of deployment during the past week of
reconnaissance, the committee believed that the Soviets were trying to “achieve quick
operational status and then a complete site construction” as soon as possible.264
McCone received an addendum to the Joint Evaluation from Lundahl that same evening,
indicating the presence of both MRBM and IRBM missile sites.265 The following morning,
McCone met with Dave Boyle, one of the NPIC ballistic missile experts, who showed him the
construction sites that conformed to previous IRBM sites in Eastern Europe. Following that
briefing, McCone traveled with Cline and Lundahl to another meeting with the president at
2:30.266 This meeting had a particular importance because the president, his advisors, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the regular EXCOMM members were meeting to give their reports on
blockade or air strikes.267 McCone instructed Cline to brief the group on the Joint Evaluation
from October 19, and Lundahl showed the locations of both the MRBM and IRBM sites. Current
intelligence showed sixteen SS-4 MRBMs, aimed towards the central United States.268
McNamara argued that despite the disagreements in the group on plans of action, the military
commanders were ready to implement either option.269 The blockade option “aimed at
preventing any addition to the strategic missiles already deployed to Cuba and eventually to
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eliminate these missiles.”270 Following the investigation, they would negotiate for removal of all
missiles in Cuba, which might include a trade with the missiles in Turkey and Italy. One of the
key problems with the blockade was the length of time it took to achieve their objective of
removing the missiles from Cuba. The blockade also risked “serious political trouble in the
United States” and a weakening of the U.S. international position.271 However, the blockade did
have the advantage of doing less damage to America‟s allies in Europe, and allowed the United
States to maintain its traditions against surprise attacks and leadership in the Free World. Taylor
and the Joint Chiefs opposed the blockade option and argued, “Now was the time to act because
this would be the last chance we would have to destroy the missiles.”272
After arguments from Rusk, Ball, and Taylor, and Sorensen, Bundy detailed the air strike
proposal.273 Robert Kennedy informed the president that the plan had the support of Bundy,
Taylor, the Joint Chiefs, while Dillon and McCone supported parts of the plan.274 Taylor argued
that the air strikes gave them the chance to take out the missiles, the IL-28 bombers, and the
SAM sites. McNamara again cautioned the president that an air strike might not remove all the
missiles, which Taylor countered with the argument that not removing those weapons meant the
United States had to invent new procedures for dealing with military threats. Robert Kennedy
argued that the air strikes were an option if the blockade failed, which McCone supported.
McCone argued that Kennedy should issue an ultimatum “that if the missiles were not
dismantled within seventy-two hours, the United States would destroy the missiles by air
attack.”275 McCone along with Dillon suggested that a long blockade without action gave the
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Cubans the time needed to fire the nuclear missiles at the United States, and threatened their
relationship with their Latin American allies. A limited use of force in a blockade made it much
more difficult for a military strike because of the time needed to implement the blockade and
measure its effectiveness.276
Towards the end of the meeting, Stevenson again argued for a diplomatic solution
involving the United Nations. This had the effect of turning most of the Council‟s attentions
from their own opinions to criticize Stevenson‟s position.277 Taylor, Dillon and McCone argued
against the diplomatic solution as well as Stevenson‟s claim that there might be no nuclear
weapons in Cuba. While McCone admitted there was no photographic evidence of nuclear
warheads in Cuba, he referred to Stevenson as the “St. Thomas of the generation.”278 When
Robert Kennedy pushed to have Stevenson replaced on the UN council, McCone suggested John
McCloy, which the president approved.279 McCone also requested that the president allow the
CIA to send copies of the aerial photography to allies in Western Europe, even suggesting
sending a CIA officer along with the brief.280 He suggested Tidwell to brief the Canadian
government first, giving the administration the chance to gain support from its allies before
taking action. Kennedy requested that Ball, Johnson, and Martin prepare a detailed timeline for
briefing all the groups suggested by McCone.281 The president concluded the meeting by
authorizing plans for both options, as well as informing the group of his decision to address the
nation on Monday evening.282
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By the end of the meeting, Kennedy had made his decision that the blockade was the best
option available. As the administration informed key allies about the missiles, McCone secured
more intelligence reports and estimates from the intelligence committees. The USIB released
another Special National Security Estimate while EXCOMM deliberated with the president.
After the committee reported on the current status of the weapons in Cuba, along with the
purposes of these weapons, the group analyzed the options provided by McCone‟s notes,
providing several consequences to each action. If the United States failed to confront the Soviets
on the missiles, the Soviets most likely would continue the buildup indefinitely.283 It believed no
action by the Kennedy administration would provide encouragement to communist movements
around the world and cause considerable damage to American power. A simple warning would
not remove the missiles, and perhaps would lead to negotiations for concessions.284 On the issue
of the blockade, even a total blockade would not prevent the Soviets from using submarines to
deliver nuclear warheads. The presence of a blockade would place considerable pressure on the
Soviet government. It would require direct action to remove Castro‟s regime, not a blockade.285
If the president chose the air strike option, it would have a much greater chance of provoking the
Soviet Union, by forcing the Soviets to attack the United States somewhere in the world. General
war became a real possibility if the United States chose to attack, but the board stipulated that
they did not believe the Soviet Union would directly attack the United States.286
McCone also received the Joint Committee‟s analysis on the U-2 flights up to October
18. At the two MRBM sites first discovered, it appeared that they were nearly ready for
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deployment, with visible signs of launch crews, missiles, and other military equipment.287 The
committee argued that according to the recent photography, “an emergency operational
capability to launch some of the missiles on hand with about 8 hours [of preparation] could now
exist at the four MRBM sites.”288 If construction proceeded at the current pace, the committee
believed all the missiles at Site 1 and Site 2 would be ready for launch by Thursday, October 25.
At the third MRBM site in the Sagua La Grande region, photography showed portions of the
missile regiment arrived on October 17, but was not ready for more than an emergency
deployment before November 1. The speed of construction at the fourth MRBM site in the
Guanajay area showed a much higher construction rate than previous Soviet efforts, with control
bunkers, blast walls, and concrete all visible from the photography. However, the board did not
believe that the missiles would be ready for launch at the IRBM sites until December. The last
flight on October 17 also confirmed the presence of nuclear storage sites under construction,
along with an unidentified SSM site in the Remedios area.289
Before McCone met with Kennedy on Sunday morning, October 21, he received another
detailed report from Carter and the USIB, which confirmed that two missile sites were
operational.290 Similar to their October 20 Special estimate, Carter informed McCone that the
construction efforts and presence of guided missiles in Cuba meant that the Soviets had been
planning the operation for at least a year.291 Reports showed that the parts to assemble 22 light
bombers and 40 MiG-21 fighters were present in Cuba.292 Carter confirmed the joint committee‟s
report there was no evidence of an operational nuclear storage site to date, but stipulated they
287

“Supplement 1 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba, 20 October 1962,” in ibid., 227-234.
Ibid.
289
Ibid.
290
“Evaluation of Offensive Threat to Cuba,‟ with cover memorandum, Carter to Members of United States
Intelligence Board, 21 October 1962,” in ibid., 235-239.
291
Ibid.
292
Ibid.
288

60

might also be in Cuba already, coming through the Port of Mariel and passing through several
checkpoints near the missile sites.293 Along with twenty-four SAM sites and three coastal
defense missile sites, current intelligence showed twelve guided missile patrol boats in Cuba.294
After receiving all the reports from the USIB and the Joint Committee and having a brief
conversation with Eisenhower, McCone attended an EXCOMM meeting with Kennedy later that
morning. According to McCone, McNamara and Taylor argued that the air strikes themselves
would only destroy ninety percent of the missiles and that an advance warning would give the
Soviets time to move the missiles to undisclosed locations.295 General Walter Sweeney296
detailed the plans for the air strike per the president‟s suggestion, and the group decided that an
air strike must include missile sites, airfields, and SAM sites. Taylor and McNamara argued that
if the president decided to authorize the attacks, they must begin by Monday morning. The
president then asked for McCone‟s opinion, and McCone advised against a surprise attack,
agreeing with Robert Kennedy‟s reasoning from the prior meetings.297 McCone reiterated his
opinion that the President should issue a public statement that the United States would remove
the missiles if intelligence showed they were not removing them.298
At 4:30 PM, McCone met in private with the president on Eisenhower‟s
recommendations on the blockade. He noted that he received an intelligence report from Lundahl
that morning, followed by his meeting with Eisenhower. McCone and Eisenhower discussed the
procedures for either the blockade or the air strike option, to which the former President
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supported the air strikes from a military point of view but not from the broader international
considerations. Eisenhower believed that the air strikes by themselves were never conclusive,
and a surprise attack set a precedent to the world that other nations might follow.299 Eisenhower
agreed that the situation called for a warning to the Soviets prior to either option and favored the
use of a blockade and eventual air strikes if the Soviets kept the missiles in Cuba. McCone told
Kennedy that because Eisenhower had only certain information on the Soviet buildup, it was
important to understand that his opinion represented “a flash judgment rather than considered
judgment” on the former President‟s part.300
After the briefing, Kennedy requested that McCone also brief Vice President Johnson. At
8:30 PM, McCone had Lundahl brief the Johnson on the current photography from Cuba and
discussed the president‟s proposed speech. Johnson believed a surprise attack was the best option
and questioned the use of a blockade followed by air strikes and invasion.301 He believed that a
warning limited the effectiveness of the air strikes, and argued that the blockade might not work.
McCone countered Johnson‟s arguments with his briefing paper from the October 20 EXCOMM
meeting. After learning of EXCOMM‟s conclusions and Eisenhower‟s recommendations,
Johnson agreed to accept the blockade option.302
After his meeting with Johnson, McCone received another evaluation from the Joint
Committee, focused on the status of the missile sites in Cuba. Based on the missions of October
18 and 19, the committee believed that the current MRBM sites had the ability to launch eighty
missiles, with each launcher reloading once.303 Photographs showed eight Soviet missile
regiments, each with eight launchers and at least sixteen missiles each. It was clear to the
299
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committee that the Soviets wanted to have all the sites ready for full operation, rather than
prepare the sites for emergency launches.304 Lundahl provided McCone with the readout from
the last mission on October 19, which showed another confirmed MRBM site, bringing the total
to five MRBM sites and two IRBM sites in Cuba. Each site showed missile trailers, erectors, and
support vehicles, with construction at each site continuing at an accelerated pace.305
McCone requested that Cline prepare a briefing for the president during the afternoon
meeting with EXCOMM on the intelligence readouts received over the past week. He reported
on seventeen separate U-2 flights from October 14 to October 20, which confirmed twenty-four
launchers for MRBM missiles at six sites, and 12 launchers for IRBM sites located at three
bases. Photography showed between over thirty missiles currently in Cuba, with no evidence of
IRBMs among them.306 The report showed four MRBM sites believed to be operational, with the
remaining two sites expected to be operational by October 25. McCone also informed
EXCOMM that the CIA received a report that a fleet of Soviet submarines was en route to Cuba
and expected to arrive within the week.307 Kennedy ordered the group to “sing one song in order
to make clear that there was now no difference among his advisers as to the proper course to
follow.”308 Kennedy then read a list of questions, asking the group to prepare answers should the
press ask the members. Because the blockade plans allowed shipments of food and medicine to
continue to Cuba, the president stipulated that the group should show the differences between the
Cuban blockade and the Berlin blockade.309 McNamara agreed with Kennedy that the Defense
Department should prepare for air strikes and the invasion should the blockade fail, but did not
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want to authorize activation of the reserves. Kennedy argued that he chose the blockade option
over the air strike option because the air strikes would not remove all the missiles.310 Failure to
destroy all the missiles would allow the Soviets time to use the remaining missiles to attack the
United States. However, because they might use air strikes in the future, the president agreed
with Bundy not to discuss that fact with the public.311
The president had his final briefing with EXCOMM and members of the Senate at 5:00
PM before he addressed the nation. Having made his decision to authorize the blockade, the
meeting centered on the Soviet responses to the blockade. McCone had the task of repeating to
the group the intelligence reports from that morning, and the president reviewed the situation
over the last 8 days. After informing the attendees of the steps taken regarding Cuba, Senator
Richard Russell of Georgia wanted Kennedy to consider stronger steps than currently taken.312
Similar to Vice President Johnson, Russell believed a warning message hindered their options in
Cuba. McNamara described for Russell that an attack on Cuba would follow the blockade
should it fail.313 Other members of the group began asking questions, pertaining to the impact of
the blockade verses the air strikes. Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright also questioned the
president‟s decision to impose a blockade instead of invading Cuba, while Congressman Carl
Vinson of Georgia urged Kennedy to strike with the maximum force available. Except for the
members of EXCOMM, most of the attendees of the meeting challenged the president‟s
decision.314 According to McCone, “the president took issue with Fulbright, stating that he felt
that an attack on these bases…would involve large numbers of Soviet casualties and this would
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be more provocative than a confrontation with a Soviet ship.”315 Slightly angered but determined
in his course, the president left the meeting to prepare for the speech that would set the stage for
one of the crucial confrontations of the Cold War.
The United States discovered the missiles in Cuba while McCone traveled to the West
Coast to bury his stepson. When he arrived back in Washington on October 17, he immediately
delegated his authority as head of the intelligence community to his deputies, to allow the major
intelligence-gathering services to issue reports on intelligence at a quickened pace. He helped
establish the Joint Committee on Recent Intelligence, authorized Lundahl to take over the
analysis of U-2 photography at the NPIC, requested that Cline brief EXCOMM on the
intelligence, and ordered Carter to take over his place as Chairmen of the USIB. These decisions
allowed him to concentrate on the policy decisions during EXCOMM meetings while still
receiving intelligence reports as they arrived. McCone spent much of the first week of the crisis
in meetings with EXCOMM, determining what course of action Kennedy needed to take to
ensure the removal of the missiles from Cuba. He also had the important role of briefing former
President Eisenhower on the situation. Because of McCone‟s coordination of intelligence
organization during the first week of the crisis, Kennedy and EXCOMM had the information
they needed to make informed decisions when dealing with the Soviet government.
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CHAPTER THREE: John McCone and the Climax of the Cold War
After a week of lengthy deliberations with EXCOMM, President Kennedy decided that
the best course of action to confront the Soviet missile threat in Cuba was to initiate a blockade
of Cuba. The president informed the American public of his decision during a televised address
on Monday evening, October 22. For the next week of the crisis, McCone continued to receive
detailed intelligence estimates and reports from the committees he established at the beginning of
the crisis. He kept many members of Congress and the press informed on the crisis, and gave
U.S. Ambassador Stevenson the support of his deputies Ray Cline and Arthur Lundahl to answer
any questions on the evidence presented during the United Nations discussions. Because of his
own personal involvement in EXCOMM and the strain of the crisis, McCone requested that
Cline prepare official CIA briefings containing all current intelligence. After Khrushchev made
his decision to end the crisis by removing the missiles, McCone pressed the intelligence
community and the administration to maintain its intelligence mission in Cuba to insure that the
Soviet Union was removing the missiles as pledged. By early November, the intelligence
community confirmed to McCone that the Soviets were indeed removing the offensive weapons
from Cuba, and the crisis officially ended. McCone briefed members of Congress and the press,
advised the government on the intelligence, and advocated continued intelligence operations in
Cuba until the Soviets removed the missiles.
In his radio and television on Monday night, October 22, the president assured the people
that the government “has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on
the island of Cuba.”316 The president confirmed that the United States had conclusive evidence
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of offensive missile sites in Cuba. He told the American people that his administration received
the first reports of the missiles on Tuesday morning, October 15, and increased the surveillance
of Cuba thereafter. He explained that the MRBM sites in Cuba had the ability to launch nuclear
warheads at Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, along with any city in the
southeastern United States and Central America. The sites still under construction were for
IRBMs, each with twice the range of the MRBMs, able to attack targets from Canada to Peru.317
He stressed the establishment of a missile base in Cuba represented a serious threat to the
security of the Western Hemisphere, and that the Kremlin had deliberately lied by claiming
earlier “that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character.”318
Because of the pace of construction and the size of the project in Cuba, the president
believed the Soviets must have made the decision long before the introduction of the missiles.
Kennedy confirmed, “Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive buildup was
already in my mind, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was
instructed to make it clear once again…that Soviet assistance to Cuba pursued solely the purpose
of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba.”319 Because of the presence of missiles in
Cuba, the president insisted, “Neither the United States nor the world community can tolerate
deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small.”320 If the
Soviets maintained the missiles in Cuba, they represented a “clear and present danger” designed
to be “a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be
accepted by any country.”321
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After Kennedy described the Soviet buildup in Cuba, he detailed the American response
to Soviet actions. He promised to halt the Soviet buildup with a “strict quarantine of all offensive
military equipment under shipment to Cuba.”322 If needed, the government could expand the
quarantine to include other types of cargo but would not restrict the flow of food and supplies to
the island. While the Navy instituted the blockade, the administration planned to continue the
increased surveillance of Cuba, and if the Soviets continued construction of the missiles,
resolution of the crisis might require further action. To discourage the Soviet government from
underestimating the resolve of the United States, Kennedy argued, “It shall be the policy of this
Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western
Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States.”323 In case the situation
escalated, the president placed the military on standby alert and removed non-essential personnel
from Guantanamo Bay. Kennedy also called for a meeting with the Organization of American
States (OAS) to consider the threat to their nations and to give the United States the legal means
to protect the hemisphere. Finally, he urged Khrushchev to remove the missiles from Cuba that
threatened the stability of the region and relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Kennedy left no doubt that the United States and its people faced a difficult task, but
argued that the United States did not enter the fight for victory, but for freedom and peace in the
hemisphere and the world.324
While the president addressed the nation, the Joint Committee released their daily
evaluation on the intelligence gathered from the U-2 flights of October 20. For the first time in
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the crisis, the U-2 photography did not discover any new missile sites under construction.325
However, the photography showed an increased number of missiles and launchers at the sites.
The readout showed three additional MRBMs and four additional launchers, bringing the total to
thirty-three MRBMs along with twenty-three launchers.326 The U-2 discovered another SAM site
as well, bringing the total to twenty-four operational SAM sites.327 The photography showed no
IRBMs in Cuba, and still no information on the presence of nuclear warheads.328 The National
Security Agency (NSA) also released an intelligence report that showed several Soviet ships had
reversed course during the evening and headed back to the Soviet Union.329 McCone received
word of these reports the following morning, before his meeting with EXCOMM.
After McCone received the intelligence reports from the NSA and the Joint Committee,
he promised to bring them up during his EXCOMM briefing. Along with a report on Soviet
ships, McCone showed increased evidence that the Soviets controlled the missile sites in Cuba
without Cuban personnel. McCone then asked Lundahl to show the group the photographs from
the recent U-2 missions.330 Lundahl confirmed that the missions from October 14-20 covered
ninety-seven percent of the island, and showed several MRBM launchers possibly ready for
launch in a matter of minutes.331 Robert Kennedy asked why intelligence reports failed to
discover the operational missiles earlier, to which McCone argued that the rapid pace of
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construction led to the sudden discovery of the operational launchers.332 McCone asked the
group to allow him to brief certain members of the Senate and members of the press, which
EXCOMM approved.333 The committee then discussed the steps needed to establish the
blockade. McNamara wanted to inform the Soviets on the exact time the blockade was to begin,
and created plans to intercept the closest Soviet ships when the blockade began.334 The president
decided that if the OAS approved the blockade, it would begin on Wednesday morning, October
24.335
Following this discussion, the group considered the implications of the Soviets deciding
to initiate a blockade or launch an attack against the United States or NATO. McCone believed
that the Soviets might launch a blockade of West Berlin, and had a greater chance of capitulating
before the Cubans.336 McNamara wanted a policy in place to inform the chain of command so
they could quickly respond to any attack.337 If the Soviets launched an attack on the
reconnaissance planes, the president approved the use of attack aircraft to destroy any SAM site
that engaged them. Taylor ordered eight attack aircraft be ready to launch immediately, and the
Navy prepared to conduct search and rescue operations in case the pilot survived the attack. To
limit the U-2‟s vulnerability to fighters, Kennedy authorized the CIA and Department of Defense
to monitor air traffic in and around Cuba, and keep the U-2 away from any reported buildup.338
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The group also authorized several low-level reconnaissance flights to prepare the ordnance
required to destroy the missile sites.339
Stevenson argued that it was extremely important that the National Photographic
Intelligence Center (NPIC) and his office continue to receive new reconnaissance pictures as
soon as possible. McCone agreed to send copies of the relevant photography to Stevenson.340
Ball conveyed to the group Stevenson‟s concerns about not having enough evidence to bring to
the United Nations Security Council meeting. Stevenson proposed one large map showing the
locations of the missile sites, photographs of the construction, a list of all the missile sites, and
prior images gathered from U-2 reconnaissance over IRBM and MRBM sites in the Soviet
Union. McCone decided to accept all of Stevenson‟s requests except for the prior photographs of
missiles in Soviet territory, and ordered Lundahl and Cline to report to the UN to answer
Stevenson‟s questions.341 After McCone‟s suggestion to send Lundahl and Cline to the UN,
Bundy suggested that each member of EXCOMM have a staff member as an aide. The group
accepted McCone‟s suggestion to have Carter confer with members of the State Department and
the Department of Defense to find the best candidates for the positions.342
At the conclusion of the EXCOMM meeting, McCone returned to CIA headquarters to
brief members of the press.343 He answered questions from Arthur Krock344 on the blockade,
other options open to the president, and some of the background leading up to that decision.345
After his briefing, McCone stated, “Krock seemed in general agreement with the course of
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action.”346 Later that afternoon, McCone received calls from David Lawrence347 and Paul
Scott348 on the Cuban situation. McCone showed them several photographs to convince them the
evidence existed for their actions in Cuba.349 Lawrence and Scott wanted to know why the
intelligence community did not know sooner about the buildup in Cuba, and how Senator
Kenneth Keating350 received intelligence information in August and September.351 McCone
explained the reasons for the intelligence problems and the timing of the President‟s response,
but said nothing about Keating‟s statements.352 Lawrence and Scott argued that members of the
administration informed the press that no offensive weapons were in Cuba, even after the White
House received the contrary reports during the prior week.353 The two columnists believed that
the White House briefings over the last week misled the press, and they questioned the decision
to have those briefings.354
McCone had another conversation with Scott, where Scott attacked McCone‟s creation of
the Board of National Estimates (BNE) because of its failures to predict the placement of
missiles in Cuba. Scott told McCone, “I guess we‟re going to have to blow you out of this
(waters) for not reorganizing your estimating process.”355 He quoted from the October 4 estimate
and argued that the estimate mislead the government into believing that the Soviets did not
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intend to place missiles in Cuba.356 He called the estimate “reckless,”357 and “was just another
example of how the CIA estimating processes were not objective and served special interests.”
Despite the fact that McCone tried for weeks to make the Board consider the possibility of
missiles in Cuba, McCone told Scott that he knew nothing of the estimates.358 When he to the
CIA, he wrote, “I have been forced to defend the Executive Branch of the Government and CIA
against the questions (1) why did we not know about this sooner and (2) did we not estimate or
forecast this eventuality.”359
After the clash with Scott, McCone had similar briefings with Senator Bourke
Hicklenlooper, Senator Russell, and Congressmen Vinson.360 After briefing Russell, McCone
noted that while the senator was outspoken during the meeting with the president on Monday
evening, the Georgia Democrat, “indicated a less critical attitude towards Administration
policy.”361 Russell approved the decision of the administration, but questioned the effectiveness
of a blockade and the political consequences for American/Soviet relations.362 He believed that
an air strike and invasion were the next crucial steps after the blockade.363 Senator
Hicklenlooper, a Colorado Republican, shared Russell‟s support for the president‟s speech and
choices, as well as concerns that the president‟s advisors might pressure Kennedy to take a
weaker position in Cuba.364 McCone believed that the speech eased the senator‟s concerns, and
seemed more satisfied with the president‟s course of action than during the meeting on Monday
356
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night.365 Congressman Vinson, another Georgia Democrat, felt that the president made an
excellent speech, but believed military action was the next step if the blockade failed to produce
results.366 Vinson reviewed the naval situation with McCone, and insisted that the blockade be
effective, and preparations for a swift attack be in place to remove Castro. After the meetings,
McCone pointed out that Vinson and Russell “were very inquisitive as to the position of the joint
chiefs.”367 McCone defended Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairmen Taylor and other supporters
of the quick action group, as well as the civilian administration‟s decision for the blockade.
McCone told the men, “It must also be recognized that civilians with broader responsibilities, i.e.
military and political as well, necessarily had to moderate the JCS view.”368 While Russell,
Hicklenlooper, and Vinson all supported the decision not to launch a surprise attack, Russell “felt
that a warning and a following military operation might have been preferable to a blockade.”369
Once again, McCone defended the administration by pointing to the fact that the administration
had given the Soviets a clear warning in the speech, while leaving open the option for further
action.370
McCone returned to the White House for another EXCOMM meeting at 6:00 PM. It was
during this meeting that Kennedy signed the documents authorizing the blockade and other
assets needed for the operation.371 After McCone showed the preliminary reports from the lowlevel flights over Cuba, the president approved retaliatory strikes against Soviet defenses if they
365

McCone, “Meetings with Senator Russell, Senator Hickenlooper, and Chairman Vinson, 23 October 1962,” in
ibid., 289-290. See also James A. Nathan, The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (New York: Saint Martin‟s Press,
1992), 165.
366
McCone, “Meetings with Senator Russell, Senator Hickenlooper, and Chairman Vinson, 23 October 1962,” in
McAuliffe, CIA Documents, 289-290.
367
Ibid.
368
Ibid.
369
Ibid.
370
Ibid.
371
“Record of Action of the Second Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council,”
October 23, 1962, U.S. Department of State, FRUS, Vol. XI,
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frus.html (accessed August 30, 2010). See also McCone,
“Memorandum for the Files,” October 23, 1962, in ibid.

74

fired on the reconnaissance aircraft and signed the official document authorizing the Joint Chiefs
to take action in the event of an attack.372 Rusk reported that the OAS made a unanimous
decision to support the American blockade, giving the United States the legal support needed for
the operation.373 In response to the decision by the OAS, Kennedy told McNamara to review all
relevant details with the Fleet Commanders to ensure that the Navy followed his instructions.374
The group discussed the actions needed to combat Soviet resistance, including the failure of a
community ship to stop, the refusal then to allow boarding, or the Soviet captain‟s decision to
reverse course.
Assistant Secretary Steuart Pittman375 moved the discussion towards protection of the
southeastern United States in the event the president authorized the invasion of Cuba.376 Pittman
reported that if the Soviets launched the missiles from Cuba, only 40 million Americans out of
92 million residing in the southeastern United States had a chance of reaching fallout shelters.377
Pittman‟s reports worried Kennedy.378 In response, Kennedy asked for emergency steps, but
McCone believed “that not very much could or would be done; that whatever was done would
involve a great deal of publicity and public alarm.”379 Because of McNamara‟s plan to leave the
372

“Record of Action of the Second Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council,” U.S.
Department of State, FRUS, Vol. XI, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frus.html (accessed August 30,
2010). See also McCone, “Memorandum for the Files,” in ibid. See also Lawrence Burd, “Kennedy Signs
Quarantine in Cuba,” October 24, 1962, Chicago Tribune, 12.
373
“Record of Action of the Second Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council,”
October 23, 1962, U.S. Department of State, FRUS, Vol. XI,
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frus.html (accessed August 30, 2010). See also McCone,
“Memorandum for the Files,” October 23, 1962, in ibid.
374
“Record of Action of the Second Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council,”
October 23, 1962, in ibid.
375
Steuart Pittman served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense under Dean Rusk, and was responsible for the
nation‟s civil defense programs.
376
“Record of Action of the Second Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council,”
October 23, 1962, U.S. Department of State, FRUS, Vol. XI,
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frus.html (accessed August 30, 2010). See also McCone,
“Memorandum for the Files,” in ibid.
377
McCone, “Memorandum for the Files,” October 23, 1962, in ibid.
378
Ibid.
379
Ibid.

75

meeting at 7:00, McCone urged the president to allow him to give his intelligence appraisal of
the situation, because he believed that some of the items in the reports from the intelligence
community might be significant in McNamara‟s briefing to Fleet Commanders.380
At the conclusion of McCone‟s intelligence report, Kennedy was satisfied with the plans
for the blockade, and signed the executive order authorizing the blockade for Wednesday
morning, October 24.381 At 6:51 PM, he dispatched a message to Chairmen Khrushchev, stating,
“I think you will recognize that the steps which started the current chain of events was [sic] the
action of your Government in secretly furnishing offensive weapons to Cuba. I hope that you
will issue immediately the necessary instructions to your ships to observe the terms of the
quarantine.”382
McCone spent the remainder of the evening receiving intelligence estimates and reports
he requested from the BNE and the Joint Committee. He received an estimate from Abbott
Smith, the Acting Chairmen of the BNE, on the blockade‟s probable effects on Cuba.383 SMith
believed there would be no challenge to the Navy on October 24 and 25, but after that point the
Soviets could decide to engage the blockade fleet if their political efforts failed. Smith‟s
summary noted that the Soviets might stage an incident using a ship with non-military cargo and
force the United States to attack the vessel. If the attack failed to end the blockade, the board
agreed that the Soviets might attack Berlin in retaliation.384 After its analysis of Soviet
statements, the report argued that the Soviets wanted to keep their options open by avoiding
incidents but would employ submarines to protect the Soviet ships and deliver critical items
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needed to complete the missile construction. If the Soviets decided to retaliate, they would attack
either a U.S. ship or the access routes to Berlin, but Smith stipulated that despite the board‟s
recommendations on possible Soviet retaliation, most members of the board believed the Soviets
would not take military action.385
McCone also received the daily evaluation from the Joint Committee on the U-2 flights
of Monday, October 23. At McCone‟s suggestion, the committee focused its evaluation on the
completion status of the missiles, along with any changes found from the low-level
photography.386 The Soviets continued construction at the rapid pace identified during the
weekend, and the committee expected the completion of all the MRBM sites within the week.387
Neither the U-2 nor the RF-8s located any additional missiles, transports or launchers on
Monday, and showed no new missile sites under construction.388 The new photography also
confirmed that while there were no IRBMs present at the construction sites, there were
increasing efforts to camouflage equipment at those sites.389 The committee confirmed earlier
reports that several ships suspected of carrying missiles had reversed their courses, and it still
had not discovered any definite nuclear warhead storage bunkers.390 The committee believed that
while there was no evidence of nuclear warheads on the island, several Soviet transport aircraft
could also deliver up to ten nuclear warheads at a time while remaining hidden from
intelligence.391
At 10:00 AM on Wednesday, October 24, EXCOMM met in the situation room at the
White House. At the beginning of the meeting, McCone delivered the two intelligence reports he
385

Ibid.
“Supplement 5 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba, 24 October 1962 [Excerpt],” in McAuliffe,
CIA Documents, 299-301.
387
Ibid.
388
Ibid.
389
Ibid.
390
Ibid.
391
Ibid.
386

77

received the prior evening. After McCone‟s briefing, McNamara outlined his efforts to defend
the American bases in the southeastern United States.392 McNamara showed photographs of the
dispersal of U.S. aircraft, while Taylor outlined the procedures to decrease the time needed to
respond during a missile attack.393 McNamara then recounted his meetings with Fleet
Commanders, and their recommendations for naval interception of suspected ships. McNamara
also provided evidence that Soviet submarines escorted some of the ships suspected of carrying
missiles, meaning that the president might have to authorize the ships to attack those submarines
during the boarding process.394 As the mood in the situation room intensified, McCone reported,
“Mr. President, we have a preliminary report which seems to indicate that some of the Soviet
ships have stopped dead in the water.”395After hearing McCone‟s report, Kennedy made the
decision to halt the interception of any Soviet ships for at least an hour.396 At the conclusion of
the meeting, Kennedy authorized McCone, Rusk, and McNamara to take immediate action to
improve communications in the Caribbean area in order to decrease the time needed to formulate
a response to any Soviet attack on the blockade fleet.397
Most EXCOMM members spent the rest of the day dealing with the blockade. McCone
received several intelligence reports that the Soviet ships had indeed reversed course, along with
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intelligence on the Soviet construction efforts in Cuba.398 The next day, he delivered his all the
relevant intelligence as of 6:00 AM that morning. The intelligence reports confirmed that
fourteen out of the twenty-two ships presently on course for Cuba reversed their course.399
However, eight ships appeared to be continuing their approach to Cuba, five of which were
tankers. Despite the tense situation and repeated threats from the Soviet leadership, McCone
confirmed that, “We still see no signs of any crash procedure in measures to increase the
readiness of Soviet armed forces.”400 Kennedy requested that McCone prepare another
intelligence memorandum, detailing the political situation in Cuba and the effectiveness of
dropping leaflets over the island.401 Rusk asked McCone for answers regarding any changes to
the course of the ships returning to the Soviet Union, the destination of Soviet ships bound for
other nations besides Cuba, and the reaction of the Cuban public to American actions. McCone
promised answers to those questions during subsequent meetings.402
After the intelligence briefing, McNamara reported that an American destroyer
intercepted the tanker Bucharest earlier that morning. The destroyer hailed the vessel asking
what is was transporting, and discovered from its captain that it carried petroleum.403 Because it
contained only fuel, the group decided to keep the vessel under close surveillance rather than
board it.404 When the president asked the status of other ships en route to Cuba, McCone
informed him that a number of those ships in the Eastern Atlantic had changed course, but
needed more time to gather information on the Soviet ships in the Pacific. Due to the success of
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communications with the Bucharest, the group decided that the fleet should contact all ships en
route to Cuba to determine their cargo.405 At the urging of McNamara and McCone, Kennedy
also authorized another series of low-level reconnaissance flights over the missile sites, airfields,
naval ports, and the suspected nuclear storage sites.406
McCone received a plethora of information from the U-2 and RF-8 reconnaissance flights
throughout the day. The low-level flights showed that the Soviets had indeed started a crash
program to complete construction on the MRBM sites.407 The photography also confirmed the
presence of a nuclear storage site, probably completed between October 20 and 22. They also
found two assembled IL-28 bombers, three under construction, and the crates present indicating
an ability to construct twenty more. McCone provided this information to EXCOMM during the
afternoon meeting, along with the list of Soviet ships approaching the Panama Canal from the
Pacific.408 McCone noted that all ships underwent searches as they passed through the port,
negating the need for a blockade of the canal as well. On the European front, McCone had no
new intelligence on any “unusual developments in Europe.”409 McCone then passed the briefing
on to Lundahl, who once again showed the photography gathered over the past day of flights.410
The meeting then moved to diplomatic efforts in the United Nations. Rusk asked the
group about the possibility of getting the missiles out of Cuba or at least place them under the
control of the United Nations.411 He believed that if the government wished to negotiate with the
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Soviets, it needed to keep the pressure on the Soviet Union. It was crucial in the next two days
for the American delegation to convince the Soviets to stop the missile buildup in Cuba.412 If the
decision came down to the Security Council vote, Rusk believed it would receive a seven-to-two
vote; therefore, to keep the pressure on the Soviet Union during the negotiations, both
McNamara and Rusk approved the tightening of the blockade to include non-military
equipment.413 To limit the possibility of an incident, Rusk suggested the United States purchase
the charter and cargo of any steamers en route to Cuba, and offer to let the captain and owner of
the ship defect if needed. McCone agreed with Rusk‟s suggestion, because it would hinder the
Soviet economy.414
When the president joined the meeting, McNamara briefed him on the East German ship,
the Voelker Freundschaft. It was currently beyond the quarantine line and being trailed by the
destroyer USS Pierce.415 Because of the message from Secretary General U Thant to avoid any
incidents until after talks concluded at the UN, Kennedy asked if the East German ship fell under
the message‟s request.416 Bundy argued that U Thant‟s message did not cover the ship, while
McNamara showed how difficult it was to stop a passenger ship.417 The group decided to allow
the ship to pass through the blockade, but decided to tighten the blockade to keep up the pressure
on the Soviet Union.418 It was at this point in the meeting that McCone “reported that some of
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the strategic missiles deployed in Cuba are now operational.”419 With McCone‟s statement, the
conversation moved from blockade options to the possibility of air strikes and invasion. The
president then received a series of documents proposing a series of air strikes against the
offensive missile bases and bombers, a complete blockade of all military aircraft and shipments
to Cuba, and plans for an invasion of the island to remove Castro and the missiles.420
Following the meeting, McCone received a message from Carter on a MONGOOSE
operation scheduled for that week.421 Carter informed McCone that the main problem in using
MONGOOSE plans was the jurisdictional issues between the intelligence community and the
JCS.422 Carter noted that another problem was the length of time it took to approve operations
under the MONGOOSE system, time not available in the current crisis.423 He confirmed that
MONGOOSE secured 50 Cuban refugees to infiltrate the island prior to the invasion, to gather as
much intelligence as possible.424 The problem was the operation proposed by General Edward
Lansdale425 had severe logistical problems.426 In addition, the Cubans assigned to the operation
had their own interests in mind, and not that of the greater U.S. strategy for the invasion.427
Carter noted that despite these problems, planning continued on the operation. The preliminary
plan for the operation included reconnaissance of the MRBM and IRBM sites, collecting data
and establishing a network to deliver that information. Because of the nature of the crisis at that
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point, Carter believed that the operation had moved beyond the Special Group level, making it
difficult to utilize the MONGOOSE plans.428
The Joint Committee‟s daily evaluation released early on October 26 did little to ease
McCone‟s mind about the problems preparing for an invasion. The board analyzed the nine lowlevel flights as well as the single U-2 flight. While the photography of the low-level flights of
October 25 showed no new missile sites, it did show that Soviets were in a crash building
program at four of the MRBM sites, “directed toward achieving a full operational capability as
soon as possible.”429 The photography also confirmed that the Soviets had made no noticeable
effort to dismantle the missile sites and had actually increased their camouflaging efforts over
critical equipment. Thankfully, the photography from the low-level flights showed no additional
missiles, vehicles, or launch equipment at the missile sites.430 The group believed that the heavy
rains of the prior day kept the Soviets from activating the San Cristobal missile site.431 However,
they expected the site to be operational sometime that day.432 The photography also confirmed
that three of the Soviet ships believed to be transporting missiles continued their course towards
the Soviet Union.433
Early on the morning of Thursday, October 26, McCone received the CIA‟s briefing on
the intelligence received during the night.434 McCone once again briefed EXCOMM on that
intelligence, which included the present course of several Soviet ships and aircraft en route to
Cuba, status of the Soviet armed forces, and the Soviet response to the UN‟s call for
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negotiations.435 As of 6:00 AM that morning, McCone confirmed that two Soviet freighters and
five tankers remained on course for Cuba.436 One of the freighters, the Belovodsk, carried up to
twelve Mi-4 helicopters437, and was currently in the North Atlantic.438 The other remaining
freighter, the Pugachev, was near the Panama Canal, and appeared to have stopped or slowed its
progression to Cuba.439 According to the CIA reports, McCone believed that the Soviets and its
satellites had increased their alert status, but made no major changes in deployment of forces in
Europe. On the political front, sources in the Soviet Union confirmed that Khrushchev accepted
U Thant‟s proposal for U.S.-Soviet negotiations.440 McCone noted that the decision to enter
negotiations angered Chinese officials, who wanted a stronger response from the Soviets to the
crisis.441 McCone then informed the president that he halted a CIA operation that used
submarines to deliver fifty Cuban refugees to the island, pending discussions by the group.
Kennedy believed that the Special Group should study the proposal that day, suggesting that the
group reintroduce MONGOOSE as part of EXCOMM‟s deliberations.442 Kennedy believed that
the JCS and the CIA needed to coordinate all existing plans for possible covert activities as a
prelude to invasion. McCone then informed the president that the location of the SS Oxford, one
of the CIA‟s communications ships, left it open to attack from the Cuban mainland.443 Kennedy
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stated that the “Navy should have the authority to control this ship, but it should take into
account CIA‟s concern.”444
McNamara urged the president to issue a statement informing the Soviets of the
continuation of surveillance flights over Cuba because of the Soviet decision to continue
construction on the missile sites. He wanted both day and night reconnaissance flights to
challenge the Soviet air defenses, including dropping flares during the night flights. 445 When
asked his opinion, McCone informed the group that the USIB had recommended against night
reconnaissance flights.446 Rusk also questioned the effect that night missions might have on the
negotiations at the UN.447 When McNamara promoted the issue of a warning about the flights,
Stevenson supported Rusk‟s position on the issue. Due to the efforts of McCone, Rusk, and
Stevenson, the president authorized the daylight missions but delayed the night missions.448
EXCOMM discussed the objectives of the UN negotiations for that day, including forcing a
commitment from the Soviets to halt construction, halt further shipments, and removing the
existing missiles from Cuba. To accomplish these goals, the quarantine had to continue, and they
had to increase the list of items on the embargo list.449 McCone argued that any decision the
group made must end with the removal of both Castro and the missiles, because even if they
removed the missiles, Castro still could undermine his Latin American neighbors.450 Kennedy,
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Bundy, and Rusk agreed that their primary concern was the removal of the missiles from
Cuba.451
Following the EXCOMM meeting, McCone attended a MONGOOSE meeting with the
Special Group.452 Because of the rift forming between Lansdale and the CIA, McCone held the
meeting to coordinate MONGOOSE operations with the JCS plans for the invasion of Cuba.453
McCone argued that because they designed MONGOOSE to create uprisings in Cuba to remove
Castro from power, it must remain subordinate to the invasion plans.454 He quelled any belief
that the CIA failed to give Lansdale the support he needed by confirming that Lansdale would
continue as director of the operation.455 However, the changes brought by the crisis meant that
covert operations needed to compliment invasion strategies, so the military would assume some
of the responsibilities previously assigned to MONGOOSE.456 While many of the responsibilities
shifted to the military, McCone and the rest of the Special Group confirmed that Lansdale was to
be in charge of all covert activities in Cuba.457 They charged Lansdale to analyze the needs of the
government and formulate a procedures based on his available assets.458
The strain on McCone and other members of the administration became apparent during
the long Friday deliberations.459 McCone feared that the continued strain might affect their
emotional states, especially after the president authorized the State Department to prepare plans
451
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for an interim Cuban government once the invasion commenced.460 McCone argued that the
group should understand that an invasion was “a much more serious undertaking than most
people had previously realized.”461 When the Navy successfully boarded the freighter Marcula,
the intensity of the situation kept the group from lifting “the feeling of gloom that was settling
over our committee and its deliberations.”462
Throughout the day on Friday, McCone and the other members of EXCOMM continued
preparations for an invasion. At the same time, Roger Hilsman, the Director of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, received a message from John Scali, an ABC news correspondent. 463
In his message, Scali told Hilsman of a meeting with Alexander Fomin464 earlier that morning,
where Fomin asked if the State Department might be interested in settling the Cuban crisis by
dismantling the missile sites in return for an American pledge not to invade Cuba.465 Hilsman
passed this message to the president, who met with select members of EXCOMM to question the
proposal.466 McCone urged caution, because he believed, “No Soviet official of that rank could
make such a suggestion without Khrushchev‟s approval.”467 After Kennedy sent his reply to
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Khrushchev confirming his acceptance of the proposal, the group spent the rest of the afternoon
awaiting the Kremlin‟s reply.468
When Khrushchev‟s message arrived at 6:00, EXCOMM gathered to analyze the
document. The group agreed it was a very emotional and personal letter written by Khrushchev
intended to end the threat of nuclear war.469 Khrushchev promised to remove the weapons
presently in Cuba and end further arms shipments to the island. He would only do this in
exchange for the end of the American blockade of Cuba and a promise not to invade Cuba.470
The members of EXCOMM continued their examination of the document into the early morning
hours, after which the group decided to allow the State Department to prepare its own analysis
because of their emotional and physical condition. The president requested that intelligence
sources have their analysis ready for the Saturday morning EXCOMM meeting.471
The hope felt by many of EXCOMM‟s members faded when Washington received
another statement from the Soviet government.472 The second letter added the removal missiles
in Turkey to the original agreement, which severely complicated the political situation and
increased the intensity of the crisis. 473 The intelligence reports coming from Cuba did little to
calm nerves.474 Early Saturday morning, the Joint Committee released its report that five of the
MRBM sites were operational, and could launch all their missiles within six to eight hours.475
Despite Khrushchev‟s letter, photography showed no halt to construction on the missile sites.476

468

Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 86.
Ibid., 86-87.
470
Ibid.
471
Ibid., 91.
472
Ibid., 91-93.
473
Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 91-93. See also “U.S. Bars Any Deal With Turkey,” October 28, 1962, Washington
Post, A1.
474
Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 93.
475
“Supplement 7 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba, 27 October 1962 [Excerpt],” in McAuliffe,
CIA Documents, 323-325.
476
Ibid.
469

88

Another U-2 photographed a FROG missile launcher near Remedios, and a probable nuclear
storage bunker adjacent to the launchers at each site.477 Intelligence failed to determine if the
ships approaching the blockade changed their course during the night or the status of Soviet
troops.478 CIA intelligence sources also reported on the mobilization of Cuban and Soviet units
in Cuba, but stipulated that these units were under orders not to take action unless the United
States attacked.479 Other intelligence reports confirmed the activation of all twenty-four SAM
sites, and the presence of Soviet submarines near the quarantine line.480
The tense situation reached its breaking point on Saturday, October 27. McCone started
the meeting once again with a briefing on current intelligence.481 After McCone informed
EXCOMM that most of the MRBMs were operational, most of the members “seemed to be
holding their breath.”482 McNamara also confirmed that the freighter Graznyy was closing on the
blockade line, and he recommended that the Navy intercept it.483 To warn the Soviets against
approaching the line, the president requested that U Thant inform the Soviet delegation of the
established quarantine line.484 When McNamara asked for more intelligence missions, Kennedy
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authorized two missions for that day.485 However, McCone countered McNamara‟s request for
night missions, because of Carter and Lundahl‟s reports that it would have no great benefit to the
intelligence mission.486 Kennedy chose to keep the flights grounded for the time being, but he
requested they remain on standby in case he needed to alter the plans.487 The group then
discussed the missile bases in Turkey. Ball and Paul Nitze488 argued that removing the missiles
would be difficult politically.489 Nitze recommended that the group focus on Cuba, and not on
the U.S. bases in other nations.490 Rusk and Bundy believed they should not link Cuba to Turkey,
because the Soviet missiles remained in Cuba.491 The president noted that he considered removal
of the missiles several days prior, but the second letter from the Soviets eliminated the possibility
of quietly removing the missiles.492 Dillon believed that the second letter from the Soviets was a
stalling tactic designed to give Soviet personnel time to complete construction on the MRBM
sites.493
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When Kennedy left the meeting with Sorensen, the rest of the group discussed how to
handle the differences between Khrushchev‟s letter and the Soviet letter released afterwards.494
The president believed that the primary goal must be to end the construction on the missile sites,
and proposed opening negotiations with the Turkish government to remove the missiles.495
McNamara and Rusk noted that while the nuclear warheads remained under U.S. control, the
Turks owned the missiles.496 McCone argued that the missiles were obsolete, but wanted to add
more ballistic submarine patrols if they decided to remove the missiles.497 Because of the
political problems in removing the missiles, Kennedy believed that the missiles in Turkey were
of great military value with the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.498 He proposed a meeting
with the Turkish government to explain the situation and the possible need to remove the
JUPITER missiles to stop a war.499
Saturday afternoon created more problems for EXCOMM to consider. Rusk reported to
the group that a U-2 penetrated Soviet airspace over Siberia because of a navigation error.500
McNamara also reported that the Air Force aborted the first U-2 flight over Cuba because of a
mechanical problem. Other reports also showed that the U-2 afternoon flight over Cuba
encountered ground fire and was overdue.501 After discussing their response in negotiations with
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the Soviets, the group also decided to send a letter to Khrushchev accepting his initial proposal
and ignoring the second message‟s proposal to remove the missiles in Turkey.502 The letter also
emphasized the American position that the Soviets must cease construction on the missiles.503
At this point in the meeting, McCone received a report that the Soviets attacked a U-2
with a SAM missile, destroying the aircraft and killing the pilot. After hearing this report, the
group began a discussion on how and when to launch attacks on Cuba.504 McNamara
recommended that the group examine the plans for air strikes against Cuba. Rusk “recommended
that mobilization measures be authorized immediately.”505 General Taylor suggested that if the
Soviets refused to stop construction, the president should implement operational plans to launch
air strikes on Monday morning, followed by an invasion seven days later. McNamara believed
that if the Soviets launched attacks against the reconnaissance aircraft on Sunday, the United
States should launch immediate attacks against the SAM sites. The president agreed but refused
to make a definite decision on how to attack the SAM sites.506 When the group asked about the
status of Soviet forces, McCone confirmed that the East German forces remained in their
defensive positions, and had made no advances towards Berlin.507
The last hours of the crisis brought the United States and the Soviet Union from the brink
of war to its successful conclusion. Kennedy ordered EXCOMM to hold another meeting later
that evening. During that meeting, he approved the activation of several of the air force reserves.
If the Soviets attacked the reconnaissance flights scheduled for Sunday, he authorized the Air

502

“Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council,” October
27, 1962, U.S. Department of State, FRUS, Vol. XI, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frus.html
(accessed September 29, 2010).
503
Ibid.
504
Ibid.
505
Ibid.
506
Ibid.
507
Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 472.

92

Force to destroy the SAM sites.508 Finally, if the Soviets continued construction, he would
authorize the beginning of air strikes on Cuba for Monday morning. Later that night, the Joint
Committee reported that all twenty-four MRBM launchers were operational, and the Soviets
appeared to be dispersing their equipment to defend against air attacks.509 The photography also
showed a nuclear storage site at each of the missile complexes, as well as the port possibly used
to transport those warheads to the sites. The CIA confirmed that construction on the missile sites
continued at a rapid pace, and that the Cuban military units remained at high alert.510 However,
intelligence sources established that the Soviets had yet to change the deployment of their armed
forces, which led McCone to believe that the Soviets wanted to avert the possibility of war by
downplaying their traditional rhetoric against the United States. Khrushchev confirmed
McCone‟s belief that the Soviets did not want to start a war when he made the decision to
withdraw the missiles from Cuba on Sunday morning, October 28.511
Khrushchev‟s decision to withdraw the missiles from Cuba lowered the threat of war.
Washington Times reporter James Reston referred to this moment as “following the normal
pattern of the cold war. When one giant demonstrates its willingness to risk a major war…the
other giant pulls back.”512 However, the American government required confirmation before it
would lift the blockade. At the morning meeting of EXCOMM, Rusk congratulated the members
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of the committee for their help in resolving the crisis.513 The group agreed to halt the
reconnaissance flights scheduled for the day and prepared statements to the public and to the
negotiators at the United Nations.514 The group also ordered McCone to release all pertinent
intelligence information to the UN delegation and send CIA experts along to answer any
questions.515 To protect the intelligence sources and his deputies, he authorized Cline to send Bill
Tidwell516 and Colonel David Parker517 to conduct the briefing.518 He also wanted to protect the
intelligence sources used in the crisis and convinced EXCOMM to send older intelligence
photographs to the UN.519 McCone believed that the United States needed to maintain its
pressure on the Soviet Union during the negotiations, in order to maintain their position until the
Soviets removed the missiles.520 Over the next several days, McCone pushed EXCOMM to
continue surveillance of Cuba to determine if the Soviets were removing the missiles from
Cuba.521 On November 1, when the Air Force grounded the remaining Agency U-2s, McCone
pushed EXCOMM to allow the flights to continue.522 When some members of EXCOMM
viewed reports from refugees that the Soviets had indeed began removing the missiles, McCone
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pushed for more reconnaissance flights to confirm the information. Finally, on November 2, the
photography confirmed the dismantling of the missiles, officially ending the crisis.523
McCone spent much of the time after the president‟s public address receiving the most up
to date intelligence to bring to EXCOMM meetings. McCone had the important task of briefing
members of the press and Congress on the situation. He also provided deputies to answer
questions during the UN talks, despite his personal belief that the talks hurt the diplomatic
standing of the United States. Thanks largely to the changes he made to the intelligence process
during the first week of the crisis, he provided the first reports of the course changes in Soviet
ships, giving Kennedy the time to halt any action against those ships. When McCone realized the
strain on himself and the rest of the EXCOMM, he had his deputies prepare detailed intelligence
memorandums containing the most recent intelligence reports. These groups allowed McCone to
confirm for EXCOMM that while the Soviets continued construction, their armed forces
remained in their defensive posture, eliminating some of the concern within the group. When
Khrushchev chose to remove the missiles, McCone protected the intelligence sources and his
deputies from the public eye, which allowed those sources to continue their efforts to determine
whether the Soviet was withdrawing the missiles. His management during the last days of the
crisis allowed the group to maintain detailed surveillance on the removal of the missiles, and
pinpoint definitively that the Soviets were removing the missiles.
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CONCLUSION
John McCone had a profound impact on the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the
establishment of intelligence committees during the crisis, and the gathering of intelligence
following the crisis. During the summer and fall of 1962, he maintained that the Soviet Union
might place nuclear weapons into Cuba.524 He believed that Khrushchev wanted to place missiles
in Cuba as a way to solve the Soviet Union‟s strategic goals and secure Castro‟s communist
government.525 McCone made his concerns clear to President Kennedy and other members of the
administration before leaving on his honeymoon in late August 1962. During his honeymoon, he
called for more reconnaissance flights over Cuba, and remained informed of the situation
through his deputy. When he returned from his honeymoon, he still found gaps in the
reconnaissance over western portions of Cuba and immediately requested more overflights.526
After the president finally authorized more, the October 14 flight discovered several Soviet
missiles in Cuba. Because of McCone‟s “crusade”527 during the summer and fall of 1962, the
United States confirmed that the Soviet Union had placed nuclear missiles in Cuba.
When McCone learned of the October 14 U-2 flights, he wanted the Kennedy
administration to remove Castro and his communist government from power. McCone joined
several prominent members of EXCOMM in proposing a surgical strike against missile sites
followed by an invasion.528 During the first days of the crisis, McCone favored immediate action
against Cuba, but realized that the blockade best served their immediate goals while limiting the
risk of war. McCone provided daily intelligence reports in EXCOMM meetings, keeping

524

McCone, Memorandum for the File, “Discussion in Secretary Rusk‟s Office at 12 o‟clock, 21 August 1962,”
NSA, Cuban Missile Crisis, DNSA, http://www.nsarchive.chadwyck.com (accessed June 12, 2010).
525
Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 146.
526
James and Hubbell, Strike in the West, 9.
527
Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 198.
528
Ball, Past is Another Pattern, 290.

96

Kennedy and his cabinet informed on construction efforts in Cuba.529 He expedited the time
between receiving intelligence reports from Cuba by creating several intelligence committees
and delegating his authority to his deputies, Carter, Cline, and Lundahl. McCone also briefed
Eisenhower on the situation, and reported to Kennedy on Eisenhower‟s recommendations.
McCone‟s efforts to coordinate and integrate intelligence reports permitted the president to have
a detailed picture on the status of the Soviet missiles, allowing him to make informed
decisions.530 Kennedy based much of his decision on blockading Cuba on the recommendations
from McCone and the rest of EXCOMM.531
After Kennedy‟s address to the nation on October 22, McCone spent much of the time
gathering intelligence reports and evaluations to bring to his meetings with EXCOMM. He also
briefed members of the press and Congress on the president‟s decision to launch a blockade.
During the negotiations with the Soviet Union, he provided deputies to answer questions during
the UN talks, despite his personal belief that the talks hurt the standing of the United States.
Because of the changes he made to the intelligence process during the first week of the crisis, he
provided the first reports of the course changes in Soviet ships, giving Kennedy the time to halt
any action against those ships. When the strain started to affect his decisions, McCone had his
deputies prepare detailed intelligence memorandums containing the most recent intelligence
reports. The groups McCone established allowed him to confirm for EXCOMM that while the
Soviets continued construction, their armed forces remained in their defensive posture. When
Khrushchev chose to remove the missiles, McCone protected the intelligence sources and his
deputies from the public eye, which allowed those sources to continue their efforts to determine
whether the Soviet was withdrawing the missiles. His management of the intelligence sources
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during the last days of the crisis allowed those sources to maintain a detailed surveillance of the
removal of the missiles, and pinpoint definitively that the Soviets were removing them.
When the crisis ended in the 1962, scholars focused on the reasons why the crisis
happened.532 The historians of this period relied on interviews, memory, and previous surprise
attacks on the United States as evidence for their conclusions.533 In the late 1960s and 1970s,
members of EXCOMM began to release memoirs on the crisis, and actual intelligence training to
emphasize the timeline, intelligence methods, and the problems facing the Kennedy
administration during the crisis.534 In the 1980s, the release of several more memoirs and
classified documents allowed historians to construct detailed pictures of the event.535 After the
Cold War ended in 1991, both the United States and the Soviet Union released several
declassified documents, which led to a resurgence in scholarship.536 The new scholarship that
emerged in the period focused on the mindset of government officials, the Soviet motivations for
their actions, and the steps the Soviet Union took to keep their operation in Cuba a secret.537
Despite the importance of McCone‟s role in the intelligence community and the
EXCOMM, no historical works focus on connecting his influence before, during, and after the
crisis. Most historians viewed McCone as the primary reason that the United States found the
missiles, but otherwise focused their studies on the larger crisis itself. While McAuliffe‟s CIA
Documents provide many of the CIA‟s internal memorandums, it does not contain all the
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sources. The Foreign Relations of the United States database offers the transcripts of EXCOMM
meetings and official memorandums, but suffers from the lack of context similar to McAuliffe.
The personal memoirs from EXCOMM participants and intelligence officials give insight into
the mindset and actions of the participants, but remain limited in their interpretations. Even with
the declassified documents, memoirs, and histories on the crisis, nothing connects McCone‟s
participation from the discovery of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba to the resolution of the
crisis.
When the majority of the intelligence community and the government failed to predict
the introduction of missiles into Cuba, McCone pressed for a re-evaluation of that belief. When
the president needed a group of advisors to help make decisions on the crisis, McCone served as
one of the key members of that group. He established new intelligence committees to expedite
the release of that information to Washington, allowing Kennedy to make informed decisions in
Cuba. When Khrushchev made the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba, McCone took on
the responsibility of overseeing the intelligence sources he created during the crisis to determine
if indeed the Soviets were removing the missiles from Cuba. Because of his personal efforts to
discover the truth behind the buildup in Cuba and the role he took during the crisis, McCone‟s
involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis is one of the key facets to understanding how the crisis
began and the role the U.S. government had in ending the conflict.
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